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1. Introduction 
Decision-making under uncertainty and risk has gained high attention in recent 
decades (Damásio, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2007; Glimcher, 2003). For example, it has 
been argued that indeterminate human behaviour can be at least partially explained 
through probabilistic tools (Glimcher, 2003). Glimcher (2003) specifically assumes 
that the findings obtained in the quite nascent field of neuroeconomics are able to 
contribute to a more thorough understanding of behavioural and neuronal processes 
that involve indeterminate processes, like decision-making under uncertainty and risk. 
Our investigation of impaired human decision-making in Bechara’s Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) aims to incorporate the theoretical assumptions of Bechara’s proposed 
neurocognitive model of human decision-making (Bechara, 2005), current empirical 
findings in neuroeconomics (e.g., representation of subjective reward value in human 
neocortex und subcortical structures), recent findings in neurobiology and 
psychophysiology, and behavioural experimental data into a unified picture of how 
decision processes under uncertainty and risk might work. Furthermore, our work 
aims to investigate the importance of risk aversion and risk seeking behaviour, 
respectively, in healthy human subjects in the IGT, since huge differences in control 
data imply such an involvement. The theoretical and empirical findings (from three 
different computational cognitive models of IGT performance) are fitted into a refined 
version of the Expectancy-Valence Model (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002) which aims 
to give a thorough and parsimonious account for the inconclusive findings in the card 
drawing behaviour of healthy human subjects: It still needs to be shown that healthy 
human subjects decide advantageously in a consistent manner in the IGT. 
Furthermore, the impaired performance observed in ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
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(VMPFC) patients is discussed. The first eight chapters deal with the empirical 
findings obtained so far, inconsistencies, and potential flaws in the original 
interpretation of IGT results. Chapter 9 proposes a solution to these problems and 
describes the refined version of the Expectancy–Valence Model. Finally, chapter 10 
deals with the conclusions and discusses directions for future research within the IGT 
paradigm.  
2. Experimental setup of the Iowa Gambling Task 
The IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) was designed to study the role of the VMPFC (and 
later also the amygdala) in real-life decision-making within a laboratory setting. 
Individuals with lesions in this cortical area display abnormal behaviour in their social 
and emotional lives (e.g., ignoring of future consequences of decisions, 
impulsiveness, flattened emotionality), although their intellectual abilities remain 
intact. 
In this task, participants have to choose cards from four decks named A, B, C, and D. 
The players are instructed to decide so as to minimize their losses and maximize their 
gains. The seed capital for the game is a loan of $2000 of play money. Turning a card 
leads to an immediate monetary gain of $100 for decks A and B, and of $50 for decks 
C and D. However, losses are incurred in an unforeseeable manner, which are large 
for decks A and B (the “bad” decks) and small for decks C and D (the “good” decks). 
Apart from the magnitude of the losses, another difference is that losses are more 
frequent for decks A and C than for decks B and D. The net gain is the same for decks 
A and B (minus $25 per trial), and also the same for decks C and D (plus $25 per 
trial). Each deck consists of 40 cards. Thus, the players have to be mindful of the 
possibility of running out of cards.  
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Table 1: Payoff schedule of the original IGT. Table adapted from Colombetti (2008, Table 1, p. 59). 
 
 Deck A (+100) Deck B (+100) Deck C (+50) Deck D (+50) 
1     
2     
3 -150  -50  
4     
5 -300  -50  
6     
7 -200  -50  
8     
9 -250 -1250 -50  
10 -350  -50 -250 
11     
12 -350  -25  
13   -75  
14 -250 -1250   
15 -200    
16   -25  
17 -300  -75  
18 -150    
19   -50  
20    -250 
21  -1250   
22 -300    
23     
24 -350  -50  
25   -25  
26 -200  -50  
27 -250    
28 -150    
29   -75 -250 
30   -50  
31 -350    
32 -200 -1250   
33 -250    
34   -25  
35   -25 -250 
36     
37 -150  -75  
38 -300    
39   -50  
40   -75  
 
 
To maximize the overall monetary gain, participants have to turn cards predominantly 
from decks C and D. It is important to note that the players are not aware when a loss 
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will be incurred and are not able to calculate exactly the net gain of the four different 
decks. Furthermore, the players are not instructed as to how many cards they will 
have to turn until the game stops (the game stops after 100 cards have been turned). 
The sequence of cards is identical for all participants (see Table 1) and the available 
time for deciding which card to turn next is self-determined. 
3. The Somatic Marker Hypothesis  
According to Damásio and Bechara (Bechara and Damásio, 2005; Damásio, 1994) 
there are two possibilities how somatic markers are generated. First, somatic markers 
are theorized to be emotional responses of the body proper. If an emotionally arousing 
experience triggers a somatic state, then a pattern for it is stored in memory (i.e., 
generation of affective memories). Any stimulus that evokes these emotive memories 
connected to the experience re-enacts this pattern and produces a somatic state 
equivalent to that triggered by the original experience (i.e., somatic markers generated 
via the body loop). Second, activation of neural representations of somatic states in 
the insula, somatosensory cortices, and the brainstem can induce changes in 
neurotransmitter release which simulate somatic states “intra-cerebrally” (i.e., somatic 
markers generated via the as-if body loop). In these cases somatic states are not re-
enacted in the body1.  
Damásio (1994) assumes that somatic markers are activated before any kind of cost-
benefit analysis of the premises takes place and before problem-solving reasoning 
processes occur, and lead to a pleasant or unpleasant gut feeling (when conscious). 
Thus, somatic markers can bias or adapt the decision process under uncertainty and 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, this argument is reminiscent of the idea of advance modelling in motor control (Wolpert 
and Ghahramani, 2000). 
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risk. Furthermore, he argues that somatic markers not only provide relevant emotional 
information in an experimental setup like the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) but also can 
limit the generally huge range of possible alternatives in real-life decision-making. In 
this way, somatic markers can be seen to help constrain the search space taken into 
consideration. Evans proposes a similar idea in his Search Hypothesis of Emotion 
(Evans, 2002). Accordingly, De Sousa also states that emotion is “one of Nature’s 
ways of dealing with the philosophers’ frame problem2” (De Sousa, 1987, p. 195). In 
real-life decision-making, somatic markers generated from secondary emotions3 can 
support a prediction of the outcome of emotionally similar conditions and can narrow 
down the range of available alternatives for (re)action. Only after the options are 
confined do cost-benefit analyses and deduction processes take place. Thus, the 
restriction of the search space can help increase the accuracy and efficiency of the 
decision process. Positive somatic markers can help overcome immediate negative 
events in favour of future rewards. Complementarily, negative somatic markers can 
aid avoidance of immediate positive events in order to prevent future losses. 
4. Experimental results from the Iowa laboratory  
To test the SMH, Bechara and colleagues (1994; 1996; 1997) compared the behaviour 
of healthy individuals to patients suffering from bilateral damage of the VMPFC in 
the IGT. They compared the behavioural performance (i.e., how many cards are 
selected from the “good” decks compared to the “bad” decks), the generation of 
                                                 
2
 The frame problem refers to the problem of constraining the beliefs that need to be updated as a 
consequence of action. 
3
 Secondary emotions are affective reactions that have already been associated to particular situations, 
objects, and persons by Hebbian learning (Damásio, 1994, pp. 134-139). 
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anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs)4, and the subjects’ knowledge of the 
game structure. In the series of experiments conducted by Bechara and colleagues 
(1996; 1997), all participants showed normal SCRs after experiencing punishment 
and reward, respectively (i.e., normal reward/punishment SCRs mediated via the 
amygdala system; see Chapter 5.1. The impulsive system). After turning 10 to 50 
cards and thus encountering some of the penalties, normal controls began to generate 
SCRs before turning cards from the “bad“ decks (Bechara et al., 1997). 
Simultaneously, they also began to avoid turning cards from these decks and shifted 
their initial preference for the “bad” decks towards the “good” ones. In contrast, 
VMPFC patients failed to shift their initial preference for the “bad” decks towards the 
“good” ones. Furthermore, while VMPFC patients developed punishment/reward 
SCRs, they did not generate anticipatory SCRs before turning cards from the “bad” 
decks, which suggests that they fail to produce anticipatory somatic markers. Bechara 
and colleagues (1997) concluded that these anticipatory SCRs act as negative somatic 
markers to support the decision process under uncertainty and risk. Interestingly, 
VMPFC patients persisted in turning cards from the “bad” decks, although the 
declarative knowledge that the “good” decks were more advantageous was mostly 
present in the conceptual period (after drawing the 80th card) of the game5.  
                                                 
4
 A skin conductance response (SCR) is an often used and well defined measure of emotional arousal. 
It is usually recorded together with other autonomic parameters like heart rate, eye movements, 
respiration rate, skin temperature, muscle tension, and blood pressure (Stern et al., 2001). 
5
 The IGT can be divided into four periods: (1) The pre-punishment period before the participants 
encounter their first loss (cf. exploration phase of a game), (2) the pre-hunch period, where they still 
have no notion of what is going on in the game (cf. exploitation phase of a game), (3) the hunch period, 
where they express certain preferences for the four different decks, and (4) the conceptual period, 
where verbalized knowledge is available (Bechara et al., 1997, p. 1294). 
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Bechara and colleagues (1997) conclude that emotive memories associated with the 
actual situation trigger characteristic somatic states through the VMPFC system (see 
Chapter 5.2. The reflective system). These somatic states are supposed to bias 
subsequent cost-benefit analyses and reasoning processes. It is important to note that 
impairments in the IGT only arise when the right hemisphere is affected (Manes et al., 
2002) and that VMPFC patients generally show normal intellectual abilities, including 
memory, attention, and other cognitive functions. To summarize, Bechara and 
colleagues (1997) suppose that overt reasoning processes — including the recall of 
available knowledge of a given situation and deriving behavioural strategies to handle 
it — are preceded by covert emotional biases. 
5. A neurocognitive framework for the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis 
Damásio’s SMH can be seen as a reformulation and refinement of the well-known 
James-Lange Theory. The American psychologist William James and the Danish 
psychologist Carl Lange independently proposed (James, 1884; Lange, 1885) that 
emotions are cognitive responses to information received from the periphery (i.e., 
from somatic signals). Similarly, Damásio (1994) assumes that somatic markers as 
measured through anticipatory SCRs are bodily signals that can bias cognitive 
responses. For example, they are supposed to guide the card drawing behaviour of 
participants in the IGT (Bechara et al., 1997). If these important somatic signals are 
missing, the decision process of the subjects is impaired, since calculation of the 
expected value is not easily possible in the IGT and thus participants have to rely on 
their gut feelings (if conscious) to decide from which deck to draw the next card 
(Bechara et al., 1997).  
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Interestingly, substance dependent individuals (SDIs) show impairments in the IGT 
that are highly similar to those of VMPFC patients (Bechara and Damásio, 2002; 
Bechara et al., 2002). They seem oblivious to the ultimate outcomes of the IGT (as 
well as the future consequences of drug intake in their real lives) favouring immediate 
rewards. Furthermore, SDIs fail to exhibit anticipatory SCRs (i.e., somatic markers) 
when turning cards from the “bad” decks. Complementarily, recent imaging studies 
(Volkow et al., 2004) show abnormal activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (including 
the VMPFC) in SDIs (i.e., decreased activity during drug withdrawal and increased 
activation during drug exposure). Thus, an altered functionality of the VMPFC in 
addicts (at least in cocaine addicts) seems plausible. Furthermore, other imaging 
studies also suggest hyperactivity in the amygdala, and associated efferent and 
afferent connections in cocaine addicts (Childress et al., 1999). In a modified version 
of the IGT with high immediate punishment and long-term gain in the “good” decks 
and low immediate punishment and long-term loss in the “bad” decks, SDIs (alcohol 
addicts (n=17), cocaine/crack addicts (n=14), and methamphetamine addicts (n=8)) 
showed the following responses: 64% of SDIs6 who were impaired in the original IGT 
were not impaired in this alternative version (Bechara and Damásio, 2002; Bechara et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, this subgroup showed higher reward SCRs compared to 
normal controls and VMPFC patients in relation to the “good” decks. The anticipatory 
SCRs towards the “good” decks were not significantly different from normal controls, 
while VMPFC patients failed to show anticipatory SCRs towards both types of decks 
                                                 
6
 To our knowledge there is no empirical evidence that different kinds of addiction (i.e., alcohol, 
cocaine, and methamphetamine) lead to distinct behavioural and psychophysiological responses within 
the IGT paradigm. 
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(Damásio et al., 2002). These results may indicate a hypersensitivity to reward, 
enabling SDIs to perform advantageously on this version of the IGT. 
The SMH may thus provide a neurocognitive framework to understand the processes 
operating in the cognition of SDIs (Bechara, 2005). These processes fail to overcome 
immediate gains in order to prevent negative future consequences (monetary loss in 
the IGT and loss of important social relationships, of social standing, and financial 
losses in real life). The VMPFC and the amygdala are both assumed to be key 
structures for the triggering of the relevant somatic states, with the amygdala 
responding to environmental stimuli and the VMPFC responding to already associated 
memories, knowledge, and cognition. The functional theory proposed in Bechara 
(2005) mainly distinguishes two interacting (or competing) systems (see Figure 1): 
First, there is an impulsive system, which is mediated by subcortical structures like 
the amygdala and the striatum, which trigger the somatic states of immediate events 
(positive and negative, respectively). Second, there is a reflective system, represented 
by the VMPFC, brainstem nuclei (e.g., nucleus parabrachialis), and somatosensory 
cortices (e.g., insula and somatosensory cortex), which trigger the somatic states 
associated with expected future outcomes. 
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Figure 1: Derived neurocognitive model of proposed functional system interactions. An over-
activation of the impulsive system can bias or outweigh the influence of the reflective system in 
decision-making. Red lines (no line marker) indicate excitatory connections; dashed red lines indicate 
modulated excitatory influences; blue lines (filled circle  line marker) indicate inhibitory 
connections; green lines (diamond  line marker) indicate modulatory connections. 
5.1. The impulsive system 
The basolateral nuclei of the amygdalae receive information from different sensory 
modalities. Afferents project from the basolateral nucleus, the input region of the 
amygdala, to the central nucleus, the major output region of the amygdala. 
Bidirectional pathways project from the central nucleus to the brain stem, to the dorsal 
medial nucleus of the thalamus, to the anterior cingulate gyrus of the cortex, and to 
the orbitofrontal cortex (the latter two are involved in the conscious perception of 
emotion) through the ventral amygdalofugal pathway. Furthermore, bidirectional 
projections connect the central nucleus with the lateral hypothalamus, the bed nucleus 
of the stria terminalis, and the nucleus accumbens through the stria terminalis (i.e., 
one of the two major dopaminergic pathways) (Kandel et al., 2000). Thus, the 
Impulsive system: 
Focus on immediate 
reward 
• Amygdala 
(over-activation) 
Impulse control, attention, 
and working memory: 
• DLPFC 
• Lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex 
• Inferior frontal gyrus 
• Anterior cingulate gyrus 
 
Reflective system: 
Focus on future consequences 
• Posterior VMPFC 
(near future; certainty) 
• Anterior VMPFC 
(distant future; uncertainty) 
Affective memories 
(conscious urge): 
• Insula 
• Somatosensory cortex 
Behavioural responses 
(unconscious approach): 
•  Ventral striatum 
•
Memory 
(e.g., goals, 
 social rules): 
• Hippocampus 
Motor 
output 
Sensory 
input 
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amygdala might be able to serve a dual purpose, influencing both the 
autonomic/reflexive and the cognitive/reflective components of emotion. 
According to the functional theory proposed in Damásio (1994) and Bechara (2005) 
the amygdala functions as the trigger of the impulsive system. The amygdala 
associates sensory stimuli with their immediate rewarding and aversive properties, 
respectively. Emotional responses activated by the amygdala are relatively fast and 
transient. The amygdala responds by activating visceral motor structures (i.e., 
hypothalamus and brainstem) which lead to changes in the peripheral nervous system. 
Furthermore, the amygdala activates action-related structures (i.e., striatum, 
periaqueductal grey, and brainstem) that mediate affective facial expressions and 
approach/avoidance behaviour. Patients with bilateral lesions of the amygdala show 
similar behavioural results in the IGT as VMPFC patients (Naqvi et al., 2006). They 
fail to produce anticipatory SCRs, which is also the case in VMPFC patients, but — 
in contrast to VMPFC patients — amygdala patients also fail to show SCRs in 
response to rewarding and punishing events. The latter indicates that the ability to 
form immediate emotional responses to objects, persons, or situations is also disturbed 
in amygdala patients. 
5.2. The reflective system 
The ventral amygdalofugal pathway and the mesocorticolimbic pathway (i.e., the 
second major dopaminergic pathway) both play important roles in consolidating the 
associations between sensory stimuli and their rewarding and aversive properties. 
According to the proposed functional theory (Bechara, 2005; Damásio, 1994), the 
VMPFC is supposed to trigger these emotive memories (i.e., representations of 
affective neuronal patterns already associated with a certain situation, object, or 
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person) which can be either real or imagined. Thus, the bodily states triggered by the 
VMPFC are emotional reactions in response to affective memories which are similar 
to an actual confronted situation (person or object). 
Conscious gut feelings triggered through the reflective system are represented within 
the insula, somatosensory cortex, and the anterior cingulate gyrus (within the temporal 
association cortex), whereas unconscious responses are represented within the 
mesolimbic dopaminergic system (especially, the ventral striatum and the nucleus 
accumbens). Both can bias the decision process either with or without specific 
feelings of desire or aversion for the option in question (Naqvi et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, Pineda (2008) recently suggested that the somatosensory cortex should 
be regarded as part of an extended mirror neuron system because of its specific 
functional and anatomical characteristics. Furthermore, he assumes that this extended 
mirror neuron system, comprising the amygdala, insula, and the somatosensory 
cortex, is important for the understanding of affective facial expressions as well as for 
empathy in humans. Thus, the mirror neuron system might also contribute to the 
development and activation of emotive memories (cf. simulation theory). 
5.3. Further functional systems 
In addition, several other systems are involved in decision-making. They are briefly 
described in the following sections, and their functional role is also discussed. 
5.3.1. Impulse control and response inhibition 
According to Bechara’s (2005) neurocognitive account of decision-making under 
uncertainty and risk, the ability to inhibit intruding memories and thoughts is 
mediated through the lateral orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (including 
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the inferior frontal gyrus). Perseveration errors and problems in shifting attention are 
cited as typical symptoms in patients with lesions in these cortical areas. The most 
posterior part of the VMPFC, including the anterior cingulate gyrus and the basal 
forebrain, are identified as critical structures in impulse control — the ability to 
suppress autonomic responses. Thus, these systems are taken to have to be intact in 
order to be able to succeed in complex behavioural tasks, like the IGT. 
5.3.2. Attention and working memory 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus are essential structures for 
working memory and attention as well as for memory formation and consolidation 
(Kandel et al., 2000). The ability to attend to stimuli and to memorize the history of 
former events is essential for the performance of almost any cognitive or behavioural 
task. It could be demonstrated that decision-making in the IGT relies on an intact 
working memory system, but that working memory is independent of deficits in 
decision-making (Bechara et al., 1998). 
5.3.3. Motivation and behaviour 
The striatum, especially the ventral-striatal system (dopaminergic nuclei), is important 
for mediating the appetitive phase of acting (Panksepp, 2005). The alteration of 
approach/avoidance behaviour is supposed to occur at an unconscious level, whereas 
the formation or triggering of feelings by the VMPFC in the insula, the somatosensory 
cortex, and the anterior cingulate gyrus is assumed to be conscious (Bechara and 
Damásio, 2005; Naqvi et al., 2006). 
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5.4. Interaction of the functional systems in the case of addiction 
The proposed functional theory provides a theoretical framework explaining the 
“myopia for future consequences” (Bechara, 2005, p. 1458) observed in SDIs as well 
as in VMPFC patients. In SDIs, the reflective system is supposed to get suspended 
through hyperactivation of the impulsive system. It is unclear whether the over-
activation of the amygdala and its efferent and afferent connections is the cause of 
addictive behaviour or rather its consequence. Nevertheless, Bechara (2005) clearly 
assumes a causal role of a weakened reflective system (through both environmental 
and innate factors) in addiction. 
Over-activation in the impulsive system, with the amygdala acting as the major 
trigger, can lead to neuropharmacological changes (especially in the release of 
dopamine and serotonin, respectively) within the different afferent and efferent 
projections (see Figure 1). First, the ventral striatum may be affected, leading to an 
unconscious bias in approach behaviour towards drug-related stimuli. Imaging studies 
already have indicated that cocaine addicts show altered activity in the amygdala 
(Childress et al., 1999). Second, alterations in the activity of the insula and the 
somatosensory cortex (especially in the right hemisphere) can lead to modulated 
affective neuronal representations of persons, situations, or objects. Recent results 
show that individuals who are suffering from insula damage show a higher success 
rate in remaining abstinent from smoking compared to individuals with an intact 
insula (Naqvi et al., 2007). Thus, the insula may be implicated in the subjective utility 
of drug reward or conscious urge component of addiction (at least in smoking). Third, 
neuropharmacological changes in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, the inferior frontal 
gyrus, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the hippocampus, and the anterior cingulate 
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gyrus can lead to difficulties in impulse control, memory (working memory and long-
term memory), and attention, respectively (Bechara, 2005). 
It is important to note that in decision-making (e.g., whether to use a drug) both 
positive and negative somatic states arise, with the stronger one biasing the final 
decision (cf. winner-takes-all). Consequently, if there is an over-activation in the 
impulsive system, this activity can become so strong that it can bias or even outweigh 
the activity triggered by the reflective system. Thus, ignoring probable future 
consequences of regular drug intake and focusing on the immediate rewarding 
properties of the situation can be the result. 
Addicts tend to prefer smaller over larger and sooner over later rewards (Bechara, 
2005). Hence, the time component in drug use seems to be important and has to be 
considered. Interestingly, the VMPFC can be divided into two sections, with one area 
(posterior) responding to near future consequences, and the other (anterior) to distant 
future consequences (Bechara and Damásio, 2005). Furthermore, the same two 
sections respond differently to the degree of certainty of options, with the posterior 
VMPFC getting active when the options are quite sure and the anterior part of the 
VMPFC responding to highly uncertain options. As indicated by imaging studies, 
(cocaine) addicts show abnormal activations in these neural structures dependent on 
the level of (un)certainty to get access to their preferred drug at the end of the 
experimental session (Bechara, 2005). 
Finally, one should keep in mind that there are large interindividual differences in 
SDIs. Addicts that act similarly to VMPFC patients in the IGT show higher 
impairments in real-life decision-making compared to addicts (although the minority) 
that show IGT results lying in between normal individuals and VMPFC patients. Drug 
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takers that behave like normal individuals in the IGT show almost no impairments in 
their social and financial realms (Bechara, 2005).  
6. Challenging the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
The SMH has been called into question by several different laboratories. The most 
important arguments against the original interpretation of IGT results are discussed 
and critically evaluated in the following sections. 
6.1. Is the proposed bias really unconscious? 
A study by Maia and McClelland (2004) shows that participants in the IGT have 
knowledge of the advantageous strategy before they apply this knowledge to the 
decision as to which card to draw next. This is in direct contrast to the original 
interpretation of somatic markers as covert signals, proposed by Bechara and 
colleagues (1997). It is unclear why the participants do not apply their knowledge 
immediately. According to the authors, possible answers might be that this time lag is 
due to exploration of the decks or risk seeking tendencies. The authors infer from their 
results that there is no need to consult unconscious or covert biases to explain the shift 
in behaviour towards the “good” decks: The participants eventually act 
advantageously because they know the correct strategy. Maia and McClelland (2004) 
suggest that there are several reasons to assume explicit reasoning. First, the time to 
decide which card to draw next is self-paced. Second, rewards and punishments are 
presented in an explicit numerical way, and third, the approximate characteristics of 
the game are relatively easy to recognize. 
Recent reports (Bechara et al., 2005; Naqvi et al., 2006) assume that somatic markers 
can be either conscious or unconscious, i.e. conscious when leading to certain gut 
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feelings or unconscious when such a feeling component is missing. In their early 
studies, Bechara and colleagues (1994; 1997) supposed that the influence of somatic 
markers in the IGT acts at an unconscious level only, in spite of the fact that their 
participants were not asked whether they did experience a certain feeling before 
turning the cards or not. In this regard, it must be noted that Damásio (1994) already 
stated that somatic markers can be either conscious or unconscious. However, when 
knowing the difference between the “good” and the “bad” decks in the conceptual 
period of the game, VMPFC patients continue to draw cards from the “bad” decks 
(Bechara et al., 1997). This finding is taken to clearly suggest that an important 
support mechanism or an important component in decision-making (e.g., the somatic 
marker) is missing in these patients. 
6.2. What exactly do anticipatory SCRs encode? 
6.2.1. Anticipatory SCRs: Indicators of risk? 
A potential objection to the original interpretation of anticipatory SCRs before 
drawing cards from the “bad” decks as negative somatic markers comes from Maia 
and McClelland (2004). The authors suggest that anticipatory SCRs reflect the higher 
amount of gains and losses in the “bad” decks. In agreement with this hypothesis, 
Tomb and colleagues (2002) found that in an alternative version of the IGT, in which 
the “good” decks are associated with higher amounts of both reward and punishment 
(see Table 2), the participants showed higher SCRs before turning cards from the 
“good” decks. Thus, it seems that anticipatory SCRs do not indicate the “goodness” or 
“badness” of the respective deck but rather the magnitude of gains and losses or the 
riskiness of the different decks. They assume that “card selection is driven by long-
term consequences, whereas anticipatory SCRs are driven by the immediate act to be 
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performed, independently of the positive or negative long-term value of the decision” 
(Tomb et al., 2002, p. 1103).  
In a reply, Damásio and colleagues (2002) argue that the study of Tomb and 
colleagues (2002) is conceptually flawed because the “good” decks in their alternative 
version provide both higher immediate rewards and long-term gains, whereas their 
“bad” decks lead to low immediate gains and long-term loss. Thus, no conflict 
between the two decks arises. Their interpretation is that “the immediate tendency to 
prefer the higher reward does not need to be opposed in order to achieve” (Damásio et 
al., 2002, p. 1104). Furthermore, they assume that somatic markers can be both 
positive and negative (Damásio, 1994) and that the function of somatic markers is to 
help adapting the decision process under uncertainty and risk. But if there are both 
positive and negative somatic markers, what is it that distinguishes them? It would be 
useful to include other autonomic parameters that are known to differentiate between 
positive and negative affective states (Vernet-Maury et al., 1999) in future studies. 
Bechara and colleagues (2000; 2002) experimented with their own modified version 
of the IGT, which involves a reversed schedule of punishment and reward but 
maintains the important component of conflict (i.e., high immediate punishment and 
long-term gain in the “good” decks and low immediate punishment and long-term loss 
in the “bad” decks). They found SCRs before turning cards from the “good” decks in 
normal controls and interpret this finding as the triggering of positive somatic 
markers. VMPFC patients performed disadvantageously on this version of the IGT 
also. 
To summarize, VMPFC patients seem to lack an important physiological signal, i.e. 
the somatic marker, which can help adapt the decision process under uncertainty and 
risk. Although it cannot be ruled out that anticipatory SCRs also represent higher 
Are somatic markers indicators of risk?  Sandra T. Weber 
 
22 
variance decisions, it seems implausible to reduce them to an indication of magnitude. 
The failure to produce this kind of emotive signals coincides with disadvantageous 
decision-making in the IGT, so a certain role in guiding the decision process seems 
likely, even if no causal role can be inferred (see Chapter 6.3. Causality).  
 
Table 2: Payoff schedule in the original IGT (above) and in the alternative version of the IGT (below). 
Table adapted from Tomb and colleagues (2002, Figure 1, p. 1103). 
Deck Type Gain every 10 cards 
Loss every 10 cards  
(# punishments) 
 
A Bad $1000 $1250 (5) 
B Bad $1000 $1250 (1) 
C Good  $500 $250 (5) 
D Good  $500 $250 (1) 
Deck Type Gain every 10 cards 
 
Loss every 10 cards  
(# punishments) 
 
A Good  $2250 $1500 (5) 
B Good  $2250 $1500 (1) 
C Bad $250 $1000 (5) 
D Bad $250 $1000 (1) 
 
A recent study by Fum and colleagues (2008) reports that the frequency of 
punishments can explain the card drawing behaviour in the IGT paradigm. They 
found a preference for deck B (one of the “bad” decks) and deck D (one of the “good” 
decks), both of which involve fewer but high magnitude punishments. These results 
are at odds with the SMH. Since they did not record any psychophysiological signals, 
nothing can be inferred about the role of anticipatory SCRs in their investigation. It 
would be interesting to study whether anticipatory SCRs would align with the 
participants’ card drawing behaviour in their experimental setup. At the moment, it 
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remains largely unclear why their subjects did not draw more cards from the “good” 
compared to the “bad” decks. We think that either another factor is contributing to the 
observed disparate behaviour of their participants or an important factor inherent to 
the original IGT paradigm is missing in their experimental setup. The authors argue 
that in the original IGT the influence of punishment frequency is intertwined with the 
expected value (i.e., the net gain) of the respective deck. They further assume that this 
could explain the “prominent deck B” phenomenon7 and the fact that some healthy 
individuals show decision patterns reminiscent of those produced by VMPFC patients 
in the IGT (Bechara et al., 2002). However, it could also be the case that punishment 
frequency is an important additional factor that possibly explains IGT results better 
than the SMH. But at the moment we doubt that this is a valid inference, especially 
without further experimental evidence to back up this claim. We think that 
punishment frequency should be regarded as a possible additional factor that might 
contribute to the overall perception of the riskiness of decks together with the 
magnitude of rewards and punishments involved8. However, Fum and colleagues 
(2008) further found that participants choose significantly more cards from decks B 
and D when the net gain is held constant between all four decks, with punishment 
frequency being the only distinguishing factor between the four different decks.  
To summarize, it seems that at least three dissociable influences contribute to the 
individual performance of participants in the IGT: (1) The subjective reward value9, 
(2) the magnitude of rewards and punishments involved, and (3) the frequency with 
                                                 
7
 It could be shown that healthy participants tend to draw more cards from the disadvantageous deck B 
than from the advantageous decks C or D (Toplak et al., 2005; Wilder et al., 1998). 
8
 Furthermore, we assume that separate sensitivities to reward and punishment play an important role in 
the decision strategy of healthy human subjects as well as VMPFC patients in the IGT. 
9
 The influence of subjective reward values to the decision process is discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
Neural representation of subjective reward value. 
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which rewards and punishments appear in the IGT. Interestingly, ongoing work in our 
laboratory was able to show that the results of Fum and colleagues (2008) may solely 
depend on the altered payoff schedule they used (Rakovský, 2009, unpublished work). 
Rakovský (2009) found that the decision strategy in the IGT paradigm is highly 
sensitive to the payoff matrix. The author employs computational modelling based on 
a refined ACT-R model of IGT performance originally described in Fum and Stocco 
(2004) to back up this claim and found that the implemented card drawing algorithm 
behaved exactly like healthy human subjects in the original IGT and in the IGT with 
the altered reward/punishment schedule (see Figure 2) used by Fum and colleagues 
(2008). 
 
  
  
Figure 2: Reproduction of the card drawing behaviour of healthy human subjects (dark grey) in the 
original IGT (left panel) and the altered version of the IGT (right panel) by a computational model 
(light grey). Figure reproduced from Rakovský (2009, Figure 1 and 4, pp. 7-8). 
 
However, the interpretation of these results is difficult at the moment. The changes in 
card drawing behaviour might be explained by the following different facts: (1) The 
decks are not restricted to 40 cards; participants can draw as many cards as they want 
from any single deck. (2) The punishments in decks B and D arise much earlier (card 
number 4) than in the original IGT (cards 9 and 10). (3) The rewards vary in 
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magnitude10 and thus require more cognitive capacity to memorize; it could therefore 
be argued that the participants experience more difficulties in developing a hunch 
about the overall benefit or riskiness of the four different decks. It would be quite 
interesting to determine how the subjects react psychophysiologically (i.e., 
measurement of anticipatory SCRs) in the altered version of the IGT proposed by 
Fum and colleagues (2008). However, if seemingly minor changes to the 
reward/punishment schedule produce dramatically different behavioural results, what 
consequences for the SMH and in particular the IGT paradigm should be inferred? We 
assume that the frequency of rewards and punishments together with their magnitude 
contribute to the perceived riskiness of the four different decks and that risk 
perception could be captured by the individual’s separate sensitivities to reward and 
punishment (see Chapter 7.3. Altered sensitivity to rewarding and punishing events). 
6.2.2. Response to feedback 
Another objection to the original interpretation of IGT results comes from a study by 
Suzuki and colleagues (2003). They found that participants who show higher 
feedback SCRs tend to have a better learning curve on the IGT, which means they 
choose the “bad” decks (i.e., decks A and B) less frequently in late trials than in early 
trials (Suzuki et al., 2003). Furthermore, feedback SCRs are larger following 
punishments and following selections from “bad” versus “good” decks (Suzuki et al., 
2003). Thus, it could be inferred that mastering the task is related to experienced 
feedback rather than to emotional farsightedness as endorsed by Damásio (1994). 
                                                 
10
 The rewards vary between $80 and $100 in the disadvantageous decks and between $40 and $60 in 
the advantageous decks. Furthermore, the punishments in deck B vary between $1210 and $1290. 
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Moreover, Crone and colleagues (2004) found larger SCRs and larger heart rate (HR) 
deceleration following punishment compared to reward, especially with decks that 
involve a low frequency of punishment (and thus large penalties). However, these 
differences could not be used to distinguish between good, average, and poor 
performers (healthy subjects) in their variant of the IGT. Anticipatory heart rate 
slowing and skin conductance levels were higher before choosing cards from the 
disadvantageous decks, but only for good performers. This latter finding provides 
some support for the SMH. However, the empirical results obtained in different 
laboratories reveal rather inconsistent results.  
6.2.3. A marker of post-decision emotional state 
It can be argued that anticipatory SCRs may reflect expectancies about reward and 
punishment after a decision has been made. Amiez and colleagues (2003) report 
empirical evidence for such an interpretation. They trained rhesus monkeys11 to 
perform a target-selection task in which the animal had to choose between two 
differently rewarded targets on a touch screen. They found SCRs occurring after the 
monkey touched a target, and conclude that SCRs do not contribute to cognitive 
information processing but indicate a post-decision emotional state. This is in direct 
contrast to the assumptions of the SMH, which states that anticipatory SCRs bias or 
guide the decision process by emotional signals (Damásio, 1994). However, the task 
developed by Amiez and colleagues (2003) involves reward contingencies that differ 
inherently from the reward/punishment schedule used in the IGT paradigm. First, the 
rhesus monkey was always rewarded — although with varying probability, which led 
                                                 
11
 It has to be noted that it might be problematic to draw inferences from animal studies without 
knowledge about the behaviour of humans in such tasks.  
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to minimization of risk in the task. Thus, if risk perception contributes to the 
development of biasing emotion-related markers, such signals should be attenuated in 
their experimental setup. Second, the task is not novel for the monkeys. Therefore, 
effects of familiarity and training might contribute to the observed time-line of SCRs 
in the monkeys. Even so, it remains an open question whether anticipatory emotional 
signals in humans reflect post-decision expectations about reward and punishment or 
biasing signals. Further studies are needed to clarify whether an interpretation of 
anticipatory SCRs as pre- or post-decisional in humans is warranted. 
6.3. Causality 
Maia and McClelland (2004) found that advantageous decision-making in the IGT is 
nearly always accompanied or preceded by conscious knowledge of which decks are 
“good” and which decks are “bad”. Thus, according to the authors there is no need to 
infer a causal role for anticipatory SCRs in the decision process of healthy human 
subjects: Their behavioural and psychophysiological results can be interpreted as a 
consequence of the already available conscious knowledge. But without further 
experimental evidence such a conclusion is not yet warranted: VMPFC patients also 
report knowledge about the reward/punishment schedule of the IGT and still show 
impaired decision-making and absent anticipatory SCRs. Furthermore, the finding of 
Maia and McClelland (2004) does not rule out the possibility that healthy subjects at 
least sometimes rely on unconscious emotional signals in complex situations requiring 
a decision. Whatever the case, causal evidence linking peripheral feedback to IGT 
performance is scarce and thus a conclusive answer to the question whether 
anticipatory SCRs act as a biasing signal in the decision process is not possible at the 
moment. Damásio (1994) originally stated that somatic markers can act either 
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unconsciously or consciously: If the emotion-related signal reaches consciousness, it 
is experienced as a gut feeling.  
Another potentially problematic result for a causal interpretation of anticipatory SCRs 
is that a group of healthy individuals did well on the IGT without generating somatic 
markers (Crone et al., 2004). It may be inferred that anticipatory SCRs are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for successful IGT performance. The results of Amiez and 
colleagues (2003) described in the preceding section further undermine an 
interpretation of anticipatory SCRs as causally involved in guiding the decision 
process. In summary, we can assert that it is rather difficult to produce direct support 
for a causal involvement of anticipatory SCRs in the decision process under 
uncertainty and risk. Ingenuous and probably more sophisticated experimental designs 
are needed to shed more light on this highly interesting question. 
6.4. VMPFC lesions: Impairments in affective shifting? 
Maia and McClelland (2004) propose a different explanation for the behaviour of 
VMPFC patients in the IGT. They assume that it is difficult for these patients to 
overcome an acquired response tendency towards the “bad” decks. The authors 
predominantly base this hypothesis on a study by Rolls and colleagues (1994) in 
which VMPFC patients were unable to adapt their behaviour in a simple reversal task. 
Unfortunately, these VMPFC patients showed lesions extending to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) which is an important functional area for attention and 
working memory and therefore necessary to accomplish nearly every kind of 
cognitive task: Lesions in the DLPFC should lead to impairments in IGT performance 
irrespective of somatic markers (see Chapter 7.1. Working memory impairment). But 
further evidence for this impairment theory comes from another study by Fellows and 
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Farah (2005). They tried to differentiate the functions of the VMPFC and the DLPFC 
in the IGT. Their results provide evidence for reversal learning impairments in 
patients with VMPFC lesions. Furthermore, they show that VMPFC patients are able 
to manage a modified version of the IGT with no need to overcome a certain response 
tendency. Their interpretation is that the neural correlate of associative stimulus-
reinforcement learning (Rolls, 2007) is disturbed in these subjects (see Chapter 7.4. 
Difficulties in reversal learning: Impaired inhibition of learned responses). However, 
Bechara and colleagues (2005) report that VMPFC patients show different degrees of 
impairment in reversal learning, depending on the actual task to be performed. For 
example, the majority of VMPFC patients show good performance on the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test which requires contingency reversal learning. Furthermore, they 
report that their patients switched decks right after encountering a punishment in the 
IGT. Thus, their immediate reactions were similar or equal to those observed in 
healthy participants. But in contrast to normal controls, VMPFC patients got back to 
the disadvantageous decks sooner and more often. Therefore, a complete lack of 
reversal learning abilities seems implausible. Busemeyer and Stout (2002) report that 
the choices of patients do not seem to be guided by the average outcome of the decks 
but rather the most recent outcome of past trials providing further empirical evidence 
for such an interpretation. 
It is of no surprise that reversal learning deficits sometimes (co)occur with 
impairments in the IGT, since the VMPFC is an essential cortical region for affective 
shifting, even though this function is located in more posterior orbital areas (Rolls, 
2004). However, reversal learning requires the ability to inhibit immediate 
(behavioural) impulses (see Chapter 5.3.1. Impulse control and response inhibition). 
Here, a negative somatic marker may function as a “stopping” signal needed to inhibit 
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a certain response tendency that is no longer rewarding. Accordingly, the inhibition 
can be seen as a “decision” in itself (Bechara et al., 2005). In a reply to this 
hypothesis, Maia and McClelland (2005) argue that there are direct projections from 
the VMPFC to the striatum both of which are important structures for reversal 
learning. Lesions to either the VMPFC or the striatum can lead to severe impairments 
in this ability. Therefore, these “projections could directly guide action selection (…). 
It would be noisy and inefficient for action selection to rely on markers that are 
generated in VMPFC, go through the body, and are then read back by the brain” 
(Maia and McClelland, 2005, p.163). They are also critical about the performance of 
VMPFC patient in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test because here the switching from 
one sensory category (e.g., colour) to another is required –– a function that involves 
predominantly the lateral prefrontal cortex and not the VMPFC (Dias et al., 1996). 
We argue that the results of Fellows and Farah (2005) and their interpretation are not 
necessarily in conflict with the SMH (Damásio, 1994). Damásio states that VMPFC 
patients are not able to overcome immediate rewarding stimuli in the favour of future 
gains. In accordance with difficulties in reversal learning, the initially learned 
association between turning a card from the “bad” decks and the immediate reward 
cannot be revised because a necessary support mechanism is not longer available, i.e. 
the somatic marker. Furthermore, Damásio (1994) and Bechara (2005) explicitly 
distinguish between the body loop and the as-if body loop. Thus, the objection stated 
by Maia and McClelland (2005) that somatic markers might be inherently inefficient 
for action selection is not necessarily warranted at least in regard to the proposed as-if 
body loop. However, as pointed out by Fellows and Farah (2005), the IGT is a rather 
complex task that involves not only stimulus-reinforcement learning and affective 
shifting, but also “the ability to attend to, synthesize, and remember complex 
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reinforcement histories [as indicated by the performance of DLPFC patients; note 
from the author] and to resolve the approach avoidance conflicts” (Fellows and Farah, 
2005, p. 58). Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind that other functional abilities, 
besides the proposed reflective processes, have to be intact (e.g., working memory 
and attention) in order to do well on the IGT and in real-life decision-making. 
7. Other psychological mechanisms 
Since Damásio’s (1994) SMH has been called into question by recent research, it is 
important to evaluate the explanatory power of other psychological mechanisms 
within the IGT paradigm. Thus, the following sections in this chapter deal with their 
proposed contribution to decision-making under uncertainty and risk and qualify their 
validity with respect to IGT performance. 
7.1. Working memory impairment 
Recent studies have suggested that conscious awareness of the reward/punishment 
schedule used in the IGT paradigm contributes to the emergence of anticipatory SCRs 
and characteristic behavioural results in the IGT (Maia and McClelland, 2004). It 
therefore seems necessary to evaluate the potential contributions of explicit learning 
mechanisms more thoroughly, in particular the contribution of human working 
memory on successful IGT performance. Bechara and colleagues (1998) argue that 
decision-making relies on intact working memory function 12 but that the functionality 
                                                 
12
 In contrast, Turnbull and colleagues (2005) report that performance on the IGT is not altered in 
conditions that involve a working-memory dependent secondary task (i.e., random number generation) 
or another secondary task (i.e., articulatory suppression). The performance of participants in both tasks 
was indistinguishable to a control group without a secondary task. Thus, it might be inferred from these 
results that IGT performance is independent of working memory load. Nevertheless, another study 
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of human working memory is independent of decision-making. In particular, they 
assume that participants with intact working memory function can show both 
impaired and non-impaired performance on the IGT and that participants’ 
performance is significantly impaired if they show compromised working memory 
functionality. Working memory function can be correlated with activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Thus, decision-making impairments in the 
IGT paradigm are expected if there are lesions either extending to or limited to the 
DLPFC (Bechara et al., 1998). Another study from a different laboratory was able to 
confirm this hypothesis and showed that DLPFC damage leads to impaired decision-
making in the IGT (Manes et al., 2002). Accordingly, Damásio (1994) states that 
somatic markers inform the decision maker about the “goodness” and “badness” of 
the options in question and mark these for subsequent cognitive information 
processing (e.g., attention and working memory). Thus, even though the empirical 
results about the necessity of an intact working memory system are still inconclusive 
neither finding would necessarily pose serious problems for the SMH. 
7.2. Risk seeking behaviour 
Several independent laboratories report experimental evidence for the involvement of 
altered risk seeking behaviour in the decision-making process of healthy subjects in 
the IGT (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Raghunathan and Pham, 
1999). For example, Lerner and Keltner (2000) report that fear and anxiety leads to 
cautious risk-averse decision-making in human subjects. Furthermore, Raghunathan 
                                                                                                                                            
(Jameson et al., 2004) reports differences between these groups in a comparable experimental setup 
concluding that working memory function is necessary but not sufficient to do well on the IGT. Thus, 
the available experimental data is inconclusive about the necessity of an intact working memory system 
for successful IGT performance. 
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and Pham (1999) argue that induced anxiety leads to risk aversion and a preference 
for low reward options, whereas induced sadness leads to a preference for high risk 
and high reward options. Interestingly, Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) report that 
depression is associated with choosing options that did not involve taking an action 
independent of risk, whereas trait anxiety is associated with a preference for low risk 
options independent of action taking. 
Thus, depression and anxiety can alter behavioural responses to perceived risks. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that these psychological characteristics vary in healthy 
human subjects without reaching a pathological level. Several studies could confirm 
that anxiety and especially neuroticism (Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004) is 
associated with risk averse behaviour in the IGT, suggesting a potential role of 
differences in risk aversion in this experimental paradigm (see also next section). To 
summarize, it could be argued that variability in risk perception cause or at least 
contribute to the observed inconsistencies in the behavioural results of healthy human 
subjects. Furthermore, since risks can be characterized as feelings that aid the decision 
process (Loewenstein et al., 2001), an interpretation of somatic markers as risk 
related-signals is not necessarily at odds with the SMH.  
7.3. Altered sensitivity to rewarding and punishing events 
Another possibility, which is directly related to risk perception, is that altered 
sensitivities to reward and punishment are able to explain the behavioural and 
psychophysiological results obtained within the IGT paradigm. Such altered 
sensitivities are generally observable in highly anxious individuals as well as in 
subjects that show high scores in neuroticism. Thus, a thorough investigation of these 
individuals within the IGT paradigm could lead to interesting results and also might 
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aid the interpretation of the inconsistent experimental results obtained in healthy 
human subjects. For example, Schmauk (1970) was able to show that high levels of 
anxiety are correlated with increased avoidance learning in male sociopaths. Carter 
and Smith-Pasqualini (2004) demonstrated that good performance on the IGT is 
positively correlated with high levels of neuroticism, as operationalized with the 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-R) (Amelang and Bartussek, 1997). Since 
neuroticism is conceptualized as positively associated with anxiety, these more recent 
findings are in accordance with the early findings of Schmauk (1970). Furthermore, 
Carter and Smith-Pasqualini (2004) confirmed that the strength of SCRs before 
choosing a card from the disadvantageous decks is positively correlated with IGT 
performance. Thus, it seems that Damásio’s (1994) neural framework of the SMH and 
Eysenck’s concept of the “visceral brain” as the neural substrate of neuroticism 
(Amelang and Bartussek, 1997) are congruent with respect to IGT performance. 
However, Miu and colleagues (2008) reported that anxiety impairs accurate decision-
making in the IGT which is at odds with the other empirical findings and needs 
further investigation.  
Interestingly, neuroticism correlates with both high sensitivity to punishment and high 
sensitivity to reward as measured with the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to 
Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) (Torrubia et al., 2001). This finding can possibly 
account for the mixed results obtained with anxious (Miu et al., 2008; Suhr and 
Tsanadis, 2007) and neurotic (Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004) individuals in the 
IGT, given that as mentioned above neuroticism is positively correlated with anxiety. 
However, anticipatory SCRs were correlated with both successful performance on the 
IGT and individual differences in neuroticism (Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004). 
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Thus, anticipatory SCRs may relate to varieties in disparate sensitivities to reward and 
punishment. 
High sensitivity to reward may lead to impairments in IGT performance as 
demonstrated by the behavioural results of SDIs (Bechara and Damásio, 2002; 
Bechara et al., 2002) and individuals with high scores in sensation and fun seeking 
(Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007). On the other side, neuroticism, which is associated with 
both high sensitivity to punishment and high sensitivity to reward, leads to superior 
performance in the IGT. However, sensitivity to reward seems to produce robust 
results with respect to impaired decision-making in the IGT and thus its contribution 
to the decision process under uncertainty and risk should be investigated in more 
detail in future studies. Similarly, high sensitivity to punishment could correspond to 
risk avoidance behaviour and could therefore also contribute to the observed 
variability in performance among healthy subjects in the IGT. It would be highly 
interesting to investigate whether neurotic individuals ever show the “prominent deck 
B” phenomenon (see Chapter 6.2.1. Anticipatory SCRs: Indicators of risk). We would 
assume that this effect is absent in neurotic participants because of their enhanced 
sensitivity to punishment. 
Finally, it seems that when people are sensitive to both, reward and punishment, a 
superior decision strategy can emerge. This finding should be investigated in future 
studies including variants of the original IGT and other risk sensitive decision-making 
tasks (e.g., the Rogers Decision-Making Task13). However, as pointed out before (end 
of Chapter 6.3. Causality), task design again seems to be a major factor with respect 
to the question whether a certain decision strategy is successful: High sensitivity to 
reward, as it is usually observed in SDIs, impairs decision-making in the IGT but can 
                                                 
13
 In this task, subjects have to choose between higher and lower probability gambles. 
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lead to superior performance when risk taking is rewarded (Shiv, Loewenstein, 
Bechara et al., 2005): In a recent study, Shiv and colleagues (2005) were able to show 
that VMPFC patients and SDIs make significantly more advantageous decisions in an 
investment task compared to healthy control subjects. In this task, each participant is 
endowed with $20 of play money14. The subjects participate in several rounds of 
investment decisions in which they have to decide either to invest $1 or not invest $1. 
In case they decide to keep their $1 bill, the next round starts immediately. If they 
decide to invest their money in the current trial, they hand a $1 bill over to the 
experimenter. After the investment is paid, the experimenter tosses a coin. They lose 
their invested money if the outcome of the toss is heads (50% chance) and win $2.50 
if the outcome is tails (50% chance). The next trial starts immediately after the 
participants pays or receives the respective amount of money. The whole investment 
task consists of 20 trials. The expected value on each trial is higher for investing 
money ($1.25) than for declining the offer to invest ($1). If one invests on each trial, 
there is a chance of 87% to end up with a higher amount of money at the end of the 
task than if one simply keeps the $20. The authors anticipated that healthy subjects 
would invest in fewer trials and thus behave less advantageously or sub-optimally in 
comparison to VMPFC patients and SDIs. Indeed, Shiv and colleagues (2005) found 
that healthy subjects showed pronounced risk avoidance behaviour in this investment 
task when compared to the other two groups. Interestingly, they were more likely to 
invest (i.e., act less risk aversely) in trials that followed previous wins than losses (see 
Table 3). 
 
                                                 
14
 At the end of the study the participants get a gift certificate for the amount of money they have won 
in the investment task. 
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Table 3: Healthy human subjects showed more risk averse behaviour after losing and winning in 
previous trials than SDIs and lesion patients. The numbers indicate the mean (median) percentage of 
decisions to invest. Table adapted from Shiv and colleagues (2005, Table 3, p. 88). 
 
 
Lesion patients 
 
SDIs 
 
Normal controls 
 
 
Decision to invest – 
overall 
83.3% (90.0%) 
 
80.9% (95.0%) 
 
57.6% (50.0%) 
 
 
Invested and lost on 
previous round 
85.4% (95.5%) 
 
81.8% (100.0%) 
 
40.5% (33.3%) 
 
 
Invested and won on 
previous round 
84.2% (100.0%) 
 
84.6% (100.0%) 
 
61.7% (66.7%) 
 
 
The authors conclude that the outcomes of preceding trials influenced the subsequent 
decisions of normal control subjects more and thus led to the observed pronounced 
risk avoidance behaviour of these participants in the investment task. In contrast, 
VMPFC patients and SDIs seemed to be not influenced by affective reactions to 
preceding outcomes leading to the observed risk seeking behaviour in these subjects. 
However, it is important to note that no direct inferences about the relevance of 
emotion-related signals in this task are warranted, since they did not include any 
psychophysiological measures of affective reactions (e.g., anticipatory SCRs) in their 
study. 
Shiv and colleagues (2005) further hypothesize that SDIs and VMPFC patients would 
still invest in the majority of trials if the expected value of each trial turned negative 
(instead of the positive value in the current experimental setup). Thus, the two patient 
groups would behave disadvantageously in a modified version of the investment task. 
The authors base their prediction on previous results from a subgroup of SDIs who 
showed advantageous decision-making in a variant of the original IGT. In this altered 
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version SDIs drew more cards from decks that involved larger and more frequent 
punishments and a larger subsequent reward (Bechara et al., 2002).  
Their current findings suggest that certain impairments in the processing of emotion-
related signals can lead to attenuated levels of risk aversion. In tasks that are 
conceptualized like the investment task (i.e., where risk-taking behaviour is rewarded) 
such impairments can lead to advantageous decision-making behaviour.15 
7.4. Difficulties in reversal learning: Impaired inhibition of learned 
responses 
The initial advantage of the “bad” decks in the IGT can cause a problem for the 
interpretation of IGT results in terms of the SMH, since difficulties in reversal 
learning can account equally well for these results (see Chapter 6.4. VMPFC lesions: 
Impairments in affective shifting?). Impairments in reversal learning or response 
inhibition occur when the participants are not able to suppress learned response 
behaviour to a given task. To evaluate the possibility that such mechanisms are 
involved in successful and impaired IGT performance, Fellows and Farah (2005) 
compared the behaviour of orbitofrontal patients (VMPFC and DLPFC patients) with 
the behaviour of healthy subjects (i.e., the control group) in the original IGT and in a 
modified version of the IGT in which the initial advantage of the “bad” decks is side-
stepped.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 As already stated by Damásio (1994, p. 174) “somatic markers are a special instance of feelings 
generated from secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected by learning to 
predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative somatic marker is juxtaposed to a 
particular future outcome the combination functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker 
is juxtaposed instead, it becomes a bacon of incentive”. 
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Table 4: Payoff schedule of the shuffled IGT. Table adapted from Fellows and Farah (2005, pp. 58-
63). 
 
 Deck A (+100) Deck B (+100) Deck C (+50) Deck D (+50) 
1 -250 -1250 -50  
2 -350  -50 -250 
3  -1250   
4 -350  -25  
5   -75  
6 -250    
7 -200    
8   -25  
9 -300  -75  
10 -150    
11   -50  
12    -250 
13  -1250   
14 -300    
15     
16 -350  -50  
17   -25  
18 -200  -50  
19 -250    
20 -150    
21   -75 -250 
22   -50  
23 -350    
24 -200 -1250   
25 -250    
26   -25  
27   -25 -250 
28     
29 -150  -75  
30 -300    
31   -50  
32   -75  
33     
34     
35 -150  -50  
36     
37 -300  -50  
38     
39 -200  -50  
40     
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To this end, they reorganized the sequence16 of the cards (see Table 4) to ensure that 
the punishments are experienced on the first trials, thus, eliminating the need for 
reversal learning in the IGT. Fellows and Farah (2005) found that healthy human 
subjects chose more cards from the “good” decks than from the “bad” decks, whereas 
participants with orbitofrontal cortex damage (VMPFC and DLPFC patients) were 
significantly impaired in their card drawing behaviour in the original version of the 
IGT (replicating the behavioural results usually obtained). Furthermore, they were 
able to show that VMPFC (but not DLPFC) patients draw significantly more cards 
from the advantageous decks in the shuffled version of the task compared to their 
performance in the original IGT. Their behaviour was statistically indistinguishable 
from normal controls in this shuffled version (see Figure 3). Interestingly, DLPFC 
patients did not do well, on neither the original IGT nor the shuffled version. Thus, 
their behavioural impairments seem not to be due to difficulties in reversal learning, 
but might reveal further evidence for the assumption that an intact working memory is 
necessary to do well on the IGT (see Chapter 7.1. Working memory impairment). 
Nevertheless, further studies are needed to corroborate this interpretation. However, 
converging empirical evidence seems to indicate that VMPFC (but not DLPFC) 
damage significantly impairs reversal learning in humans and animals (Dias et al., 
1996; Fellows and Farah, 2003; Fellows and Farah, 2005). 
 
                                                 
16
 In the shuffled version of the IGT each deck begins with card 9 by moving cards 1–8 to the bottom of 
the corresponding deck. Additionally, the cards number 11 and 14 are switched in the disadvantageous 
deck B. 
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Figure 3: The behavioural results for ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMF) patients, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLF) patients, and normal control subjects (CIG and CTL, respectively) in both the 
original version of the IGT (left panel) and the shuffled analogue (right panel) are shown. Figures 
reproduced from Fellows and Farah ( 2005, Figure 2 and 3, p. 60). 
 
We argue that reversal learning is an essential pre-requirement to do well on the IGT. 
Without the ability to change learned reward/punishment contingencies, one is 
necessarily impaired in decision-making, regardless in which paradigm it is tested. 
However, we assume that the IGT captures more than an inability in reversal learning, 
since the behavioural results are nicely correlated with psychophysiological 
measurements (i.e., anticipatory SCRs) that have not been recorded in the studies 
conducted by Fellows and Farah (2003; 2005). Thus, it is still possible that the 
inability to produce somatic makers is associated with impaired decision-making in 
the IGT. We agree that problems with reversal learning can account for the 
performance of VMPFC patients, or at least a subgroup of these patients, but we 
doubt that difficulties in reversal learning can easily explain the high variability in 
IGT performance in healthy subjects and the difficulties experienced by SDIs. Since 
IGT performance is also impaired when the amygdala is damaged, it seems warranted 
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to infer an involvement of emotion-related signals in the IGT17. Furthermore, since 
the sequence of cards is altered in the shuffled version of the IGT, it is possible that 
the important component of conflict between the “good” and “bad” decks is less 
pronounced and that this fact also contributes to the observed behavioural results in 
this shuffled version. 
8. Neural representation of subjective reward value 
The following sections aim to discuss recent research concerning the neural correlates 
of subjective reward value and related concepts. We assume that the empirical 
findings of such studies are highly relevant for the interpretation of IGT results, 
because they discuss among other things how immediate and future reward values are 
encoded cerebrally as well as the neurobiological basis of impulsiveness and the 
emergence of risk-taking behaviour. 
8.1. Interaction of an impulsive and a patient system? 
McClure and colleagues (2004) assume that the often observed discrepancy between 
immediate (short-run) and future (long-run) preferences in intertemporal choice 
reflects the differential activation of disparate neuronal systems. They argue that 
short-run impulsivity is driven by the limbic system, which responds preferentially to 
immediate rewards and is less sensitive to future consequences. This interpretation is 
in accordance with the neurocognitive framework proposed by Bechara (2005) and 
Damásio’s (1994) SMH. Both, sensitivity to the value of distant rewards as well as 
long-run patience in temporal discounting tasks are assumed to be mediated by the 
                                                 
17
 However, it should be noted here that at least one study reports that reversal learning operates 
independently from emotional information processing (Izquierdo et al., 2004). 
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lateral prefrontal cortex and associated areas. These cortical structures evaluate trade-
offs between distinct reward options, ranging from immediate to distant future 
rewards. Moreover, McClure and colleagues (2004) argue that human behaviour is 
shaped through the competing influences of limbic and paralimbic structures that 
trigger automatic processes and cortical structures that enable abstract domain-general 
reasoning and future planning. They assume that human idiosyncrasies in decision-
making and subjective reward value reflect the interaction of these two competing 
systems, both relevant in adapting and guiding human behaviour. Their argumentation 
is consistent with the SMH and the neurocognitive model proposed by Bechara but is 
challenged by a quite recent study conducted by Kable and Glimcher (2007) presented 
in the subsequent section. 
8.2. Subjective preference functions in humans: Medial prefrontal 
cortex, ventral striatum, and posterior cingulate gyrus 
According to Kable and Glimcher (2007) subjective values or preference functions, as 
they are called in economics, are encoded in the human brain. Temporal discounting 
tasks (Frederick et al., 2002) have shown that subjective reward values are not 
correlated linearly with the absolute value of a reward. For example, a person that 
would trade a $20 check that could be cashed in one week for an immediate monetary 
gain of $18, would trade the same $20 check for an immediate monetary reward of 
$15 dollars if the check could be cashed in one month. This decline in subjective 
reward value with increasing time delay varies significantly across subjects (patient 
versus impulsive discounters). Thus, the objective value together with the time 
difference cannot predict how people decide in temporal discounting tasks. Kable and 
Glimcher (2007) suggest that an idiosyncratic function (i.e., a person-specific 
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function) is necessary to relate subjective reward value accurately to disparate time 
delays. To investigate how subjective reward value is represented in the human brain 
they measured neuronal activity in healthy human subjects using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) while these subjects were deciding between different 
immediate and delayed monetary rewards. They found a significant correlation 
between neuronal activity in the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and 
posterior cingulate cortex on the one hand and subjective reward value as measured 
by psychometric tests (i.e., individual preference curves that show how subjective 
reward value varies as a function of delay and monetary gain) on the other (see Figure 
4). It is important to note that they only included subjects with stable preference 
functions over a six month period in their fMRI measurements (i.e., ten out of twelve 
subjects). 
The neuronal activity in the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior 
cingulate cortex was correlated with subjective reward value on the individual level: 
Every subject's idiosyncratic pattern of neuronal activity was predicted by that 
subject's subjective preference function. Moreover, they could show that time delay 
had stronger effects on subjective reward value in impulsive than in patient 
discounters: Impulsive decision-makers showed steeper decreases whereas patient 
subjects showed a gradual decrease in their preference functions. Furthermore, 
neuronal activity in the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior 
cingulate cortex increased as the objective amount of the reward value increased and 
decreased as the delay to reward increased. The neural tradeoffs across subjects and 
between amount and delay, as described by the individual discount functions, 
correlated with the behavioural tradeoffs between these variables indicating that 
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choosing between immediate and delayed monetary rewards involves comparing 
neuronally represented subjective values (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: (a) Cortical areas (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and ventral striatum) 
that show correlated neural activity with subjective reward value. Neural activity in the ventral 
striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex was better correlated with subjective 
value (yellow) than with (b) the objective amount of the delayed reward (red), (c) the inverted delay of 
the delayed reward (red), (d) the choice of the subject (red), or (e) the value of the delayed reward 
(red). Figure reproduced from Kable and Glimcher (2007, Figure 3, p. 1627). 
 
What are the implications of these findings for the behaviour of healthy and impaired 
subjects in Bechara’s IGT? Bechara (2005) proposes that an overactive impulsive 
system in SDIs is responsible for their impaired performance in the IGT. The results 
of Kable and Glimcher (2007) are at odds with such an interpretation, since they do 
not assume two interacting systems. However, they provide evidence that differences 
in decision-making are related to the impulsiveness of the decision-maker: Impulsive 
discounters are more likely to trade a check for less money with increasing time 
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delays than patient subjects. Since immediate rewards seem to be more attractive than 
delayed monetary rewards for impulsive decision-makers as reflected in the steeper 
discount functions in these subjects, it would be interesting to know whether 
impulsive discounters show altered activations in the VMPFC compared to patient 
discounters. If there were significant differences in neuronal activity, one could 
hypothesize that the VMPFC is directly related to the degree of impulsiveness with 
respect to choices that involve immediate and delayed monetary rewards. 
Furthermore, it would be highly interesting to measure the activity of the amygdala in 
this task and to correlate its activation to the impulsiveness of the participants as well 
as to the activation of the VMPFC.  
It seems that subjective valuations of delayed reward play an important role in 
delayed discounting tasks and thus may be very likely involved in adapting one’s 
decision strategy in situations that involve disparate immediate and delayed monetary 
gains, like the IGT. The investigation by Kable and Glimcher (2007) did not involve a 
pronounced component of uncertainty and risk while making a decision. Thus, it is 
not likely that differences in risk aversion directly contributed to the decision strategy 
in their subjects, but did contribute to the overall performance of subjects in the IGT. 
However, it seems unequivocal that the medial prefrontal cortex together with the 
ventral striatum and posterior cingulate cortex are involved in the subjective valuation 
of monetary outcomes during decision-making and that their activity is highly 
correlated with the individual preference functions of the participants. 
It is also unclear whether their results are at odds with the refined version of the 
Expectancy–Valence Model discussed later on (see Chapter 10.5. Refinement of the 
Expectancy–Valence Model). Since this model assumes that the idiosyncrasies 
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observed in healthy subjects are related to differences in risk perception18, further 
studies are needed to investigate the role of subjective reward functions in situations 
that involve uncertainty and risk before any inferences can be drawn. 
8.3. Reward expectation, prediction error, and risk perception  
It has been shown that dopaminergic neurons respond to the probability of a reward 
and to the difference between an actual reward and the conditional expectation19 of 
this reward (i.e., the reward prediction error) (Fiorillo et al., 2003). Fiorillo and 
colleagues (2003) recorded the activity of dopaminergic neurons in the ventral 
midbrain of alert monkeys and discovered that the spike trains of target neurons 
varied with respect to reward probability (see Figure 5). The conditioned stimuli were 
visual cues that the monkey had previously learned to associate with certain 
probabilities (ranging form 0 to 1) to get a reward (i.e., squirts of fruit juice). As can 
be seen in Figure 5, the recorded neuronal activity of the dopaminergic neurons was 
correlated with the reward prediction error: If the learned probability to get a squirt of 
fruit juice after presentation of an associated visual stimulus was P = 0.25, then the 
response at the time of the reward (i.e., the US) was three times as large as at the time 
of the CS.  
                                                 
18
 Risk perception is modelled through disparate sensitivities to reward and punishment. 
19
 In Pavlovian conditioning an animal learns to associate a neutral stimulus — the conditional stimulus 
(CS) — with another stimulus — the unconditional stimulus (US). In the present experiment the US is 
a certain amount of fruit juice delivered subsequently to CS-onset (i.e., different visual cues). After 
learning the association between CS and US the CS-stimulus still remains intrinsically non-rewarding 
but has acquired the function of a predictor for the US. If the US has stochastic properties, for example 
in terms of magnitude and occurrence, the experimental setup resembles a gamble. Since different 
associations can be learned simultaneously (through various different CS-UC pairings) such an 
experimental design allows the investigation of the effect of different reward magnitudes and 
probabilities. 
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Figure 5: (A) Spike trains of dopaminergic neurons in the ventral midbrain of monkeys. “CS” 
indicates the time at which the visual cue was presented, and “reward” indicates the time of the fruit 
juice reward delivery. Each sequence of vertical dashes in the raster below the horizontal line shows 
the spike train of an individual neuron, whereas the single cell histograms are shown above the 
horizontal line. (B) Population histograms of rewarded and unrewarded trials at maximal uncertainty 
(P = 0.5). (C) The magnitude of the reward responses increased as reward probability decreased (i.e., 
coding of prediction error). (D) Trials in which reward was predicted but did not occur, showed 
increasingly suppressed neuronal activity with increasing reward probability. (E) Conditioned stimuli 
(i.e., squirts of fruit juice) triggered increasing phasic activations with increasing reward probability. 
Figure reproduced from Fiorillo and colleagues (2003, Figure 2, p. 1899). 
 
Are somatic markers indicators of risk?  Sandra T. Weber 
 
49 
Accordingly, if the probability was P = 0.75, then the neuronal activity at the time of 
the reward was only one third as large as at the time of the presentation of the 
conditioned visual cue. Moreover, using fMRI Knutson and colleagues (2003) were 
able to show that neuronal activity in the area of the ventral striatum and the nucleus 
accumbens increases with reward expectation in human subjects as well.  
Fiorillo and colleagues (2003) further showed that dopaminergic neurons also respond 
to risk perception, even though with a temporal delay. In their experiment the amount 
of juice squirts was fixed, whereas the probability to get a fruit juice reward was 
varied across trials (P = 0, P = 0.25, P = 0.5, P = 0.75, and P = 1). Risk perception20 
was maximal when the trial had a probability of P = 0.5 and minimal when the 
probability was P = 0 or P = 1. They found that dopaminergic neurons in the ventral 
midbrain of alert monkeys responded with a sustained increase in activity that grew 
from the onset of the conditioned stimulus to the expected time of reward delivery 
(see Figure 6). The response was maximal when risk was maximal, i.e. at a 
probability of P = 0.5, less pronounced at P = 0.25 and P = 0.75, and absent at P = 0 
and P = 1. Statistical analysis revealed a significant effect of uncertainty on neuronal 
activity, indicating that uncertainty is encoded by this sustained neuronal response 
(see Figure 6). Since phasic and sustained activations differed in timing and relation 
to reward probability, as well as in their occurrence in single neurons, it is assumed 
that both occur independently. Fiorillo and colleagues (2003) further demonstrated 
that the observed sustained neuronal activation is specifically related to uncertainty 
about motivationally relevant stimuli: (1) Sustained activity was correlated with 
reward magnitude and (2) was not observable when the CS was another visual cue 
replacing the subsequent fruit juice reward. 
                                                 
20
 Risk is measured by variance. 
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Figure 6: (A) Sustained activation of dopamine neurons precedes potential reward at all three 
intermediate probabilities (P = 0.25, P = 0.5, and P = 0.75). “CS” indicates the time at which the 
visual cue was presented, and “reward” indicates the time of the fruit juice reward delivery. Each 
sequence of vertical dashes in the raster below the horizontal line shows the spike train of an 
individual neuron, whereas the single cell histograms are shown above the horizontal line. (B) 
Population histograms of rewarded and unrewarded trials at reward probabilities ranging from P = 0 
to P = 1. (C) Median sustained activation of dopamine neurons as a function of reward probability. 
(D) Magnitude of phasic activation plotted against sustained activation for each neuron. Figure 
reproduced from Fiorillo and colleagues (2003, Figure 3, p. 1900). 
 
To summarize, Fiorillo and colleagues (2003) showed that dopaminergic neurons 
change their spiking activity in accordance to the type (i.e., magnitude and probability 
of subsequent reward) of the conditioned stimulus. Primarily, they found that 
dopaminergic neurons show two dissociable response patterns: (1) Short, phasic 
neuronal activity patterns that adapt monotonically to increasing reward probability, 
and (2) slow, sustained responses that increased with increasing reward uncertainty. 
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The latter may help explain the behavioural results of normal controls and SDIs in the 
IGT, since the sustained, uncertainty-induced increase in dopamine can be interpreted 
as acting to reinforce risk-taking behaviour21, suggesting a possible explanatory role 
of dopaminergic activity for the inconsistencies found in these subjects. Differences in 
risk-taking behaviour (learned and established through dopaminergic activity) could 
help explain the inconsistent behavioural findings in healthy human subjects in the 
IGT. Thus, their contribution to the decision process in the IGT should be investigated 
in detail in future studies. For example, it could be studied whether ventral midbrain 
areas are differentially activated in healthy subjects who can be behaviourally 
distinguished with respect to their card drawing behaviour in the IGT and 
psychophysiologically discriminated by the strength of anticipatory SCRs and other 
autonomic parameters (e.g., heart rate deceleration). 
9. Empirical results from different variants of the IGT 
The SMH assumes that decision-making impairments in patients with VMPFC lesions 
can by explained through a deficit to produce negative or positive somatic markers 
that adapt the decision process in complex situations with uncertain 
reward/punishment contingencies. The impairments of these individuals are 
                                                 
21
 Fiorillo and colleagues (2003) argue that dopaminergic neurons are encoding the prediction error 
across the full range of probabilities and thus could provide a teaching signal for learning. Subjective 
uncertainty is assumed to indicate that one lacks an appropriate predictor (Fiorillo et al., 2003). 
Dopamine (beside its various other functionalities) might act as a non-selective attention signal 
enabling the learning of the accuracy of predictive stimuli and actions. If risk-taking behaviour is 
necessary for the learning of accurate reward predictors, then “the sustained, uncertainty-induced 
increase in dopamine could act to reinforce risk-taking behaviour and its consequent reward 
information, whereas the phasic response after prediction error could mediate the more dominant 
reinforcement of reward itself” (Fiorillo et al., 2003, p. 1901). 
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characterized by either extreme procrastination or by choosing disadvantageous 
response options. The latter is also apparent when declarative knowledge about 
correct outcome expectancies is available. Damásio (1994) and Bechara (2005) call 
this phenomenon “myopia for the future”. The results of different variants (Bechara, 
Tranel et al., 2000; Fellows and Farah, 2005; Sanfey et al., 2003) of the original IGT 
either support this interpretation or suggest that other psychological mechanisms may 
provide a more parsimonious and more accurate account for the observed behavioural 
differences in the acquisition of this task (see Chapter 7. Other psychological 
mechanisms). 
Bechara and colleagues (2000) found that VMPFC patients remain impaired when the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks are more clearly polarized (see Table 5) 
involving higher immediate punishment and larger delayed reward (i.e., advantageous 
decks) as well as lower immediate punishment and lower future reward (i.e., 
disadvantageous decks). They interpret their findings together with the results 
obtained in the original version of the IGT and argue that it seems unlikely that the 
mechanism underpinning the decision-making deficit of VMPFC patients is a loss of 
sensitivity to either punishment or reward. In another variant they increased the 
adverse future consequences associated with the “risky” decks through increasing 
delayed punishment and decreasing delayed reward. VMPFC patients were impaired 
relative to normal controls in this task, too. Bechara and colleagues (2000) interpret 
this finding as myopia for future consequences rather than altered sensitivity to 
reward and punishment in VMPFC patients. However, Fellows and Farah (2005) were 
able to show that VMPFC patients can do well on a shuffled version of the IGT (see 
Chapter 7.4. Difficulties in reversal learning: Impaired inhibition of learned 
responses).  
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Table 5: Payoff schedule of the altered IGT. Table adapted from Bechara and colleagues (2000, Figure 
1, p. 2193). 
 
 Deck E (-100) Deck F (-50) Deck G (-100) Deck H (-50) 
1     
2   +350  
3 +1250    
4  +25 +250  
5  +50   
6   +300  
7   +200  
8  +75  +250 
9  +25 +150  
10  +75   
11 +1250 +50   
12     
13  +25 +350  
14     
15   +250  
16  +25   
17  +75 +200  
18   +150  
19     
20  +75 +300 +250 
21 +1250    
22   +300  
23     
24  +25 +350  
25  +75   
26  +50 +150  
27   +200  
28   +250  
29  +75   
30  +25  +250 
31   +150  
32   +200  
33 +1250  +350  
34  +50  +250 
35  +50   
36     
37  +25 +200  
38   +350  
39  +75   
40  +50   
 
 
Furthermore, it could be shown that the card drawing behaviour of healthy individuals 
is highly sensitive to the actual payoff schedule (Fum et al., 2008; Rakovský, 2009). 
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Thus, the findings with different variants of the IGT led to rather inconclusive results 
and need further investigations. 
Sanfey and colleagues (2003) tested the hypothesis that VMPFC patients may perform 
disadvantageously on the original version of the IGT because of a decreased tendency 
to avoid risky decisions when rewards are involved. The task they designed deviates 
from the original IGT in its focus on risk preference of VMPFC patients, patients with 
other neural lesion sites, and normal controls. Participants were asked to select cards 
from five decks that differed in their variance of rewards and punishments over time 
but had identical expected values (see Figure 7). Thus, participants’ risk seeking 
behaviour could be investigated independently of the accuracy of their decision-
making abilities. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Each vertical line represents a single outcome when selecting a card from the five different 
decks. In sum, each deck had 25 outcomes. Figure reproduced from Sanfey and colleagues (2003, 
Figure 2, p. 1223). 
 
Normal controls showed risk-averse behaviour in this task and selected significantly 
more cards from the safe, low variance decks (decks 1 and 2) than from two of the 
three riskier, high variance decks (decks 3 and 522). In contrast, VMPFC patients 
                                                 
22
 They were neutral towards deck 4. 
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could be split into two sub-groups with those who were also risk averse and those who 
displayed risk-taking behaviour. The latter demonstrated a preference for decks 4 and 
5 — two of the three riskier, high variance decks — were neutral towards deck 3, and 
avoided decks 1 and 2. Interestingly, the risk-taking subgroup tended to have lesions 
extending to the DLPFC, but this difference did not reach statistical significance. 
Maybe impairments to both the VMPFC and the DLPFC account for the increases in 
risk-taking behaviour, but at the moment this is a rather speculative idea. Further 
examination of the data revealed that the risky groups paid more attention to what 
they could get (cf. increased sensitivity to reward) whereas the safe groups focused on 
the amounts of money that they could lose (cf. increased sensitivity to punishment). 
The overall results prompt the hypothesis that the poor performance of VMPFC 
patients in the original IGT may be traced to an increased preference for risky 
decisions as measured by variance. 
10. A computational cognitive model of IGT performance 
The first two sections outline the characteristics of our derived23 computational 
cognitive model of IGT performance and explain the different modules modelling two 
distinct players: (1) A rational player that bases its decisions on expected values and 
(2) an emotional player that is able to use affective information (see Figure 8). The 
only difference between the two players is the appraisal system that calculates the 
“desirability” of the four different decks (the appraisal system is missing in the 
rational player). The characteristics and modules of both players are described in 
                                                 
23
 The neurocognitive framework of decision making under uncertainty and risk developed by Bechara 
(2005) and described in detail in Chapter 4 (cf. Figure 1) provides the basis for our computational 
cognitive model. 
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detail in the two subsequent sections. The fourth section compares the card drawing 
behaviour of both players to that of the Expectancy–Valence Model (described in 
detail in section 3) developed by Busemeyer and Stout (2002) to evaluate their 
explanatory power with respect to IGT results. The last section introduces the 
proposed refinement of the Expectancy-Valence Model and discusses its assumed 
benefits with respect to the interpretation of IGT results. 
 
 
Figure 8: Computational cognitive model of the Iowa Gambling Task as abstraction of the 
neurocognitive framework: Red lines (no line marker) indicate excitatory connections; green lines 
(diamond  line marker) indicate modulatory connections; and dashed lines indicate modulated 
excitatory influences. 
10.1. The rational player 
One possibility to predict the performance of participants in the IGT is to consider 
their behaviour as rational24 simultaneously taking into account the limitations of 
                                                 
24
 Certain affect and personality characteristics can also influence the behaviour in the IGT. For 
example, negative affect and high scores in fun seeking are correlated with less advantageous decision 
strategies in the IGT (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007). To keep the computational cognitive model simple, 
such exogenous influences on IGT performance were factored out. 
Appraisal system: 
Calculation of 
“desirability” 
Attention system: Exploration and 
exploitation (adjusted by 
“desirability”; random at the 
beginning) 
Planning system: 
Highest expected 
value; adjusted by 
“desirability” 
Affective memories: 
Outcome of the 
appraisal and planning 
process  
(= “desirability” of the 
four different decks) 
Central memory: 
Goals  
(= maximization 
of win amount) 
Sensory input: 
Deck, win/ 
loss amount 
Motor output: 
Player draws a 
card 
Working memory system: 
Percept sequence; stores 
maximally 8 card values 
(= win/loss amount) 
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human rationality (cf. bounded rationality). According to Russel and Norvig (2003, 
p.36), “a rational agent should select an action that is expected to maximize its 
performance measure, given the evidence provided by the percept sequence and what 
ever built-in knowledge the agent has”. Thus, a rational player of the IGT should base 
its decision on the expected value of the four different decks (A-D). We assume that 
three different systems need to be considered with respect to this calculation: 
(1) A working memory system (cf. DLPFC and hippocampus), i.e. the player has 
to keep in mind the values of the drawn cards (cf. percept sequence). It stores the 
values of each card that is drawn in the IGT. A decay mechanism is implemented to 
simulate the limited capacity of human working memory (cf. Miller, 1956). Thus, this 
module can store maximally eight card values at a time. If the card memory runs out 
of card values for a certain deck, the expected value for this deck is set to 0. 
(2) A calculating and planning system (cf. VMPFC) that enables the player to 
draw inferences about the expected value (cf. maximize its performance measure) of 
the next card with respect to the four decks (cf. action selection). It computes the 
expected values (i.e., the objective statistics) for the four different decks. An error 
mechanism is needed to adequately simulate human inference capabilities. This is 
realized through the constrained working memory system (see above). Another 
possibility would be to use a version of running average to smooth the data. 
(3) An attention system (cf. DLPFC) that permits exploration (especially at the 
beginning of the task) and exploitation of all of the four decks. The attention for all 
four decks is equal at the beginning of the task (cf. exploration phase). After a card is 
drawn from each of the four different decks, the planning system calculates the 
expected values for the respective decks based on the card values that are stored in the 
working memory system thus shifting the focus towards the deck with the highest 
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expected value for the next card. Thus, the outcome of the last action adapts the 
decision strategy for the next card that has to be drawn25. 
10.2. The emotional player 
Emotion-related signals seem to play an important role in the decision process of 
human subjects through providing a qualitative bias in terms of the “desirability” of 
the outcomes (Damásio, 1994). Together with the likelihood of certain events, 
emotions may facilitate and accelerate the decision process. Thus, emotions may 
enable a more efficient decision strategy compared to a purely rational player 
(Bechara et al., 1994). Hence, the objective statistics calculated by the rational player 
are modulated by the “desirability” of the last outcome of the respective deck leading 
to some sort of subjective statistics about the inherent structure of the IGT. This idea 
is realized through the appraisal system. This system associates each stimulus with its 
affective information (= “desirability” of the deck) dependent on its monetary value 
(cf. primary emotions26). The “desirability” of the four different decks is calculated 
separately for rewards and punishments: (1) It remains the same if the current reward 
(punishment) corresponds to the anticipated reward (punishment) of a deck. (2) If the 
current reward is higher27 than the anticipated reward, the “desirability” for this deck 
increases. (3) The “desirability” decreases if the current reward is lower than the 
                                                 
25
 In the computational model, the planning system includes the attention system with an exploration 
and exploitation phase and the working memory system that holds a maximum of 8 card values. The 
planning system computes the expected value of the next card for each of the four different decks. 
Besides, an expectation function returns a list with actual and anticipated values that could be used for 
further refining the drawing function of the rational player in future studies. 
26
 Primary emotions are immediate emotional reactions to situations, objects, or persons (Damásio, 
1994, p. 131-134). 
27
 The “desirability” of punishments is calculated complementarily: If the current punishment is lower 
(higher) than the anticipated punishment then the “desirability” increases (decreases). 
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anticipated reward. The expected value for each deck is multiplied by the combined 
“desirability” for rewards and punishments (i.e., a standardized value between 028 and 
1) and the drawing behaviour of the emotional player is adapted accordingly. The 
working memory, attention, and planning system are equal to the rational player. 
To summarize, the decision strategy of the emotional player consists of three major 
parts: (1) The expected value before drawing a card, (2) the “desirability” of reward 
and punishment (after drawing), and (3) the anticipated “desirability” of reward and 
punishment. For example, if the player draws a card with the expected value +$50 
without punishment, and actually gets +$50 but with a punishment of -$250, the 
player will update its decision strategy to represent that drawing a card from this deck 
indeed led to a gain of +$50 but also resulted in an unexpected loss of -$250. 
10.3. The Expectancy–Valence Model 
The Expectancy–Valence Model is based on a model developed originally by 
Busemeyer and Myung (1992) to integrate learning and decision-making processes 
and described in detail in Busemeyer and Stout (2002). It assumes that the player 
integrates information about experienced rewards and punishments on each trial of the 
IGT into an affective reaction called a valence. The expectancies about these valences 
for each of the four different decks (A-D) are learned through an adaptive learning 
mechanism and serve as the input into a probabilistic choice mechanism that selects 
one of the decks in each trial. 
 
                                                 
28
 0 corresponds to the highest possible punishment in the IGT (-$1250) and 1 corresponds to the 
highest possible reward (+$100). We are aware that these boundaries are rather arbitrary and we 
suggest to estimate more reasonable values from empirical data sets in future studies. 
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10.3.1. Valences 
The experienced rewards and punishments produce an affective reaction, which is 
represented as a weighted average of gains and losses (see Equation 1). 
 
 
 
Equation 1: The valence v(t) experienced after drawing a card from deck D on trial t is calculated as 
the weighted average of rewards (R) and losses (L). The attention weight parameter w (which has to 
be estimated from empirical data sets) can vary between 1 and 0 and reflects the amount of attention 
given to rewards and punishments, respectively (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002, Equation 3a, p. 257). 
 
10.3.2. Expectancy learning 
The expectancies about the valences for the four different decks are learned through 
experience: The expected valence for deck Di on trial t is updated through an adaptive 
learning mechanism. If valence v(t) is experienced because deck D is chosen on trial t, 
the expected valence is updated according to the following equation 2: 
 
 
 
Equation 2: The update of expected valences resembles a weighted average of past valences. If the 
updating rate a (0 < a < 1) is high, then changes happen fast, which means rapid forgetting, strong 
recency effects, and short associative memories. If a has a numerical value near 0, then the update is 
very slow, which means slow forgetting, weak recency effects, and long associative memories 
(Busemeyer and Stout, 2002, Equation 3b, p. 257). 
 
The expected valences for the three decks that are not chosen on trial t remain 
unchanged. It is important to note that recently experienced valences receive more 
weight than remote affective reactions. 
10.3.3. Probabilistic choice 
The probability that a deck is chosen on the next trial is an increasing function of the 
expected valence for this deck and a decreasing function of the expected valences for 
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the other three decks. The following equation 3 represents the rule for choice 
probabilities according to the Expectancy–Valence Model as described in Busemeyer 
and Stout (2002): 
 
 
Equation 3: Probabilistic function of expected valences associated with each of the four different 
decks. The parameter θ(t) — the sensitivity parameter — controls the sensitivity of the choice 
probabilities to the expected valences. If θ(t) is set to 0, then the choice is completely random and 
therefore independent from expected valences. If θ(t) is high in magnitude, the choices strongly depend 
on the expected valences (and can even become deterministic) (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002, Equation 
3c, p. 257). 
 
The sensitivity parameter θ(t) that controls the sensitivity of the probabilistic choice 
function is assumed to vary with experience, being random at the beginning of the 
IGT (cf. exploration phase of the game) and increasing during the task (cf. 
exploitation phase of the game). Busemeyer and Stout (2002) argue that brain 
damaged individuals may experience a loss of concentration and get tired sooner than 
normal controls which can lead to differences in the sensitivity parameter across these 
groups. This assumption is described in the following equation 4: 
 
 
 
Equation 4: The sensitivity parameter θ(t) is controlled by parameter c, which is the third parameter 
that has to be estimated from empirical data sets. Positive c values indicate increasing sensitivities to 
expected valences, whereas negative c values indicate decreasing sensitivity to the expectancies that 
are used for the probabilistic choice function (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002, Equation 3d, p. 257). 
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10.4. Critical evaluation of the Expectancy–Valence Model 
The predictions of the Expectancy–Valence Model were tested by implementing29 the 
described equations into a computer algorithm and comparing the results (i.e., number 
of cards drawn from the four different decks) to the performance of the algorithms for 
the rational and the emotional player, respectively. Both are mathematically simpler 
than the Expectancy–Valence Model. 
Generally, computational modelling can be used to disentangle the different cognitive 
(e.g., expected value) and motivational (e.g., sensitivity to reward and punishment) 
mechanisms that are operating in complex behavioural and cognitive tasks like the 
IGT. It can provide a theoretical basis for identifying and measuring hidden processes 
underlying the performance in these tasks. Within the IGT paradigm, computational 
modelling could be used to evaluate what happens to the player’s decision strategy if 
one of the proposed mechanisms or systems fails (like in VMPFC patients) or to 
investigate what happens if one of the proposed systems (e.g., the impulsive system) 
gets overactive and inhibits the activity in one of the other systems (as it is assumed 
for the reflective system in SDIs). However, the present evaluation predominantly 
aims to answer the following question: Does the Expectancy–Valence Model have an 
obvious advantage in explanatory power when compared to a decision model that uses 
expected values and a limited working memory for the calculation which card to draw 
next (i.e., the rational player)? The rational player calculates expected values for the 
four different decks on the basis of the numerical net values of the last eight cards that 
are drawn. In each trial the deck with the highest expected value for the next card is 
                                                 
29
 It has to be noted that the values for the three free parameters (i.e., attention weight, update rate, and 
sensitivity parameter) were taken from the literature (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002), since no suitable 
behavioural data sets were available to our laboratory at the time of the current investigation to estimate 
the values by ourselves.  
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chosen. If there are no cards left for a deck, the expected value for this deck is set to 0. 
The algorithm selects a deck randomly when there is more than one deck with the 
highest expected value30. The algorithm that implements the equations described by 
Busemeyer and Stout (2002) computes the expected valences of the four decks for its 
decision strategy which card to draw next. The attention weight parameter that 
regulates the sensitivity to reward and punishment can vary between 0 and 1. A value 
near 0 is associated with hypersensitivity to reward and a value near 1 represents 
hypersensitivity to punishment. Thus, an attention weight of 0.5 indicates that gains 
and losses weigh equally in the decision process. According to Busemeyer and Stout 
(2002)  the decision strategy of healthy human subjects can be modelled by setting the 
attention weight parameter to 0.3531. 
 
Table 6: The table shows the mean values and standard deviations (SD) of the drawn cards (100 runs) 
for deck A, B, C, and D with respect to the three different models implemented.  
Decks Mean SD Model 
A 7.28 1.64 The rational player 
B 15.64 2.48  
C 39.69 1.77  
D 37.39 2.03  
A 7.88 2.87 The emotional player 
B 15.43 3.18  
C 39.10 2.66  
D 37.59 2.23  
A 11.00 0.00 Expectancy–Valence Model 
B 9.00 0.00 Attention weight = 0.35 
C 40.00 0.00 Update rate = 0.34  
D 40.00 0.00 Sensitivity parameter = 0.32 
 
The most interesting finding was that the decision strategy of the rational player 
seemed to be similar to the one observed in healthy human subjects, albeit with a 
                                                 
30
 It chooses one of the decks with equal highest expected value randomly. 
31
 This value is taken from the literature (Busemeyer and Stout, 2002). 
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sharper separation between “good” and “bad” decks, which means that the 
implemented computational algorithm draws more cards from the advantageous decks 
than a participant without neurological impairments would do (see Table 6). There 
was no statistically significant difference between the card drawing behaviour of the 
rational and the emotional players. However, there were some differences, although 
not statistically significant, between the results obtained with the algorithm that uses 
expected values for its decision strategy (i.e., the rational player)32 and the algorithm 
that implements the equations described by Busemeyer and Stout (2002): (1) There 
was no variation in the card drawing behaviour of the algorithm for the Expectancy–
Valence Model. Each of the 100 complete trials led to exactly the same distribution of 
drawn cards with respect to the four different decks (see Table 6). This result could be 
due to the reported estimated value for the sensitivity parameter in healthy human 
subjects. The value of 0.32 ultimately led to a probability to draw a card from the 
deck with the highest expected valence near 1 and thus the player chose almost with 
certainty from the deck with the highest expected valence. However, a more 
conclusive evaluation of this finding would need actual behavioural data to re-
estimate and evaluate the (validity of the) three free parameters reported in 
Busemeyer and Stout (2002). Without this further step no conclusive interpretations 
are warranted. (2) Another interesting result in the evaluation of the Expectancy–
Valence Model was that “only” nine cards were drawn from deck B (see Table 6). 
This result could be due to the fact that card number 9 represents the first punishment 
for deck B and the highest possible punishment in the IGT, which means that the 
participants never encounter a loss of comparable magnitude while playing the IGT. 
                                                 
32
 Similar results were obtained when comparing the results of the Expectancy–Valence Model with the 
card drawing behaviour of the emotional player (see Table 6). 
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Since the algorithm chooses almost with certainty from the deck with the highest 
expected valence for the next card and since the very high punishment leads to an 
immediate switch from deck B to one of the other decks, the expected valence for 
deck B remains low throughout the remaining trials. Thus, one of the other three 
decks always has a higher expected valence for the next card and is therefore chosen 
by the algorithm. There is no chance to get back to deck B after the first punishment is 
experienced. In contrast, both the rational and the emotional player use a limited 
working memory system, which ensures that the algorithm is able to get back to deck 
B, if with reduced probability. 
10.5. Refinement of the Expectancy–Valence Model 
The Expectancy–Valence Model in its current formulation seems to lack any obvious 
advantage in explanatory power when compared to other strategies that use either the 
expected values and a limited working memory or additional emotional information 
for the computation of card drawing behaviour in the IGT. Nevertheless, its results are 
promising enough to do further investigations. As already mentioned in previous 
chapters, normal controls tend to show a high variability in their behavioural results, 
dependent on the actual reward/punishment schedules that are used (Fum et al., 2008; 
Rakovský, 2009), their individual risk-taking behaviour (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; 
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999), and their individual levels 
of anxiety and neuroticism (Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004; Suhr and Tsanadis, 
2007)33. Thus, it seems that the model could be advanced by splitting the unimodal 
                                                 
33
 Another relevant aspect might be apathy or lack of motivation. Impaired performance on the IGT can 
be associated with decreased sensitivity to punishment but another possible interpretation could be that 
the losses simply not bother the participants enough to actively avoid the riskier decks. Empirical 
evidence (Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004) suggests improved performance of healthy subjects on 
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dimension34 of the attention weight parameter into two separate dimensions of 
valence, i.e. independent sensitivities to reward and punishment35. Such a refinement 
would make the assumptions of the Expectancy–Valence Model more consistent with 
the current experimental findings in the IGT literature. Such a refined version might 
further be able to model the observed variability in healthy human subjects36. We 
suggest the following modification of the first equation (Equation 5): 
 
v(t) = r * R [Dt] + l * L [Dt] 
Equation 5: The valence v(t) experienced after drawing a card from deck D on trial t is calculated as 
the added separate sensitivities to reward and punishment. The attention weight parameters r and l 
both can vary between 1 and 0 and reflect the distinct amount of attention given to reward and 
punishment. Both parameters have to be estimated from experimental data. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the IGT when play money is replaced by real money indicating that motivation (or rather a lack of 
motivation) might be another important factor that should be considered in future studies. In contrast, 
Bowman and Turnbull (2003) did not find any significant differences in performance when replacing 
play money with real money. 
34
 If the sensitivity to reward is high (a = 0.7), then the sensitivity to punishment is low (1 - a = 0.3). 
Since several studies report that high sensitivity to punishment can co-occur with high sensitivity to 
reward such a refinement seems necessary to capture the full range of observed (healthy) human 
behaviour in the IGT. 
35
 Interestingly, Hornak and colleagues (2004) were able to show that sensitivity to punishment and 
sensitivity to reward can be anatomically distinguished. Sensitivity to reward is impaired in patients 
with medial orbitofrontal cortex lesions, whereas sensitivity to punishment is impaired in lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex patients. Furthermore, the right hemisphere has been associated with punishment 
learning and the left hemisphere has been associated with reward learning (Davidson and Irwin, 1999). 
36
 Since a model is by definition partial and abstract, it is very important to clearly define the purpose 
and scope of the model and to outline what it might be able to explain and what it might not be able to 
explain (for a thorough review of the advantages and disadvantages of computational modelling see 
Fum et al., 2007). The refined version of the Expectancy–Valence Model predominantly aims to shed 
light on the high variability in card drawing behaviour in healthy human subjects in the IGT. We argue 
that such a refined version would be more consistent with recent empirical findings within the IGT 
paradigm than its original formulation. 
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Nevertheless, without actual behavioural data sets to estimate the two new free 
parameters r and l, the proposed refinement remains speculative, although quite 
promising, given experimental results obtained within the IGT paradigm in the last 
decade (Bechara and Damásio, 2002; Bechara et al., 2002; Carter and Smith-
Pasqualini, 2004). Future studies will have to evaluate whether such a refinement is 
able to predict the performance of normal controls and different patient groups in the 
IGT. 
11. Discussion and conclusions 
Since anticipatory SCRs and the associated card drawing behaviour in the IGT may 
correspond to a variety of psychological mechanisms involved in the decision process, 
like affective responses to feedback, risk-related signals, indicators of post-decision 
emotional state, or markers of the ”goodness” and “badness” of different alternatives, 
it seems necessary to develop computational cognitive models that help explain 
human decision-making under uncertainty and risk in the IGT and disentangle the 
contributions of the assumed cognitive and motivational factors. Such models should 
be consistent with the IGT literature and should allow formulating new hypotheses 
that can be tested in future investigations. 
We argue that anticipatory SCRs (i.e., somatic markers) embody the perceived risk of 
the four different decks in the IGT and that further autonomic parameters are needed 
in addition to the measurement of anticipatory SCRs (e.g., heart rate deceleration) to 
differentiate between the putative role of somatic markers as a stopping signal (i.e., 
negative somatic marker) or an approach signal (i.e., positive somatic marker) in the 
decision process under uncertainty and risk. Furthermore, we assume that differences 
in risk perception cause the inconsistencies observed in the card drawing behaviour of 
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healthy human subjects. We propose that a refined version of the Expectancy–
Valence Model could be able to account for these inconsistencies. Since the model 
still needs to be fully evaluated by means of empirical data sets in future studies, these 
arguments are rather speculative at the moment. However, the proposed refinement 
seems promising, because it captures important characteristics of IGT performance in 
normal controls, SDIs, and VMPFC patients. For example, healthy individuals with 
high scores in neuroticism, who show both high sensitivity to punishment and high 
sensitivity to reward (Torrubia et al., 2001), tend to do well on the IGT (Carter and 
Smith-Pasqualini, 2004). Since it can be argued that participants only have to pay 
attention to the punishment component of the payoff schedule37 to succeed in this 
task, it may seem unsurprising that neuroticism correlates positively with IGT 
performance, since neuroticism is characterized by high sensitivity to punishment. 
Thus, it may be assumed that the IGT predominantly measures behavioural38 and 
psychophysiological reactions to punishment and that more attention to this 
component in the decision process within the IGT paradigm is required. The 
predictions of such hypotheses could be tested using the proposed refined version of 
the Expectancy–Valence Model. The following two sections qualify the two main 
hypotheses within this thesis: (1) Differences in risk aversion can account for the high 
variability in performance of normal controls. (2) Decreased emotional awareness of 
risky situations in VMPFC patients can explain their poor performance in the IGT and 
their superior performance when risk taking is rewarded. 
                                                 
37
 Only the punishment schedule varies in the IGT, whereas the magnitude of rewards is fixed across 
trials: $50 for the “good” decks and $100 for the “bad” decks. 
38
 Deck position is not varied across participants in the IGT and thus can lead to the emergence of deck 
preferences that reflect a location bias rather than advantageous and disadvantageous decision-making, 
respectively. Thus, future studies should vary deck position systematically to rule out this possibility. 
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11.1. Healthy subjects: Are somatic markers indicators of risk? 
Since it can be argued that distinct sensitivities to punishment and reward are likely to 
play a role in the decision process of healthy human subjects in the IGT (Carter and 
Smith-Pasqualini, 2004), future studies should systematically investigate this 
possibility in healthy subjects. For example, the behavioural performance and 
psychophysiological responses of healthy participants in the Rogers Decision-Making 
Task (RDMT) in which subjects choose between higher and lower probability 
gambles and the IGT could be compared. According to Monterosso and colleagues 
(2001), IGT performance correlates significantly with performance in temporal 
discounting tasks but is less clearly associated with RDMT performance. They argue 
that their participants (i.e., cocaine-dependent individuals) seem to have problems in 
considering future outcomes accurately rather than having problems with risk 
perception. However, it remains open to what extent these results hold for healthy 
individuals. In our view, it seems that SDIs show an increased sensitivity to reward 
paired with a decreased sensitivity to punishment. Thus, a comparison of both tasks in 
normal controls is highly encouraged. The proposed refined version of the 
Expectancy–Valence Model could be used to evaluate the contribution of both factors 
independently, since it regards the two dimensions — sensitivity to reward and 
sensitivity to punishment — separately. However, the integration of neuroscientific 
and psychological experimental results together with insights gained from 
computational modelling can help to qualify existing decision-making theories and 
can be used to generate testable hypotheses. Such an interdisciplinary account has the 
potential to answer questions that can not be solved within the boundaries of each 
academic discipline alone.  
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To conclude, it seems that somatic markers, as operationalized by means of 
anticipatory SCRs, may represent emotion-related signals that indicate the riskiness of 
the different decks in terms of different sensitivities to reward and punishment. Thus, 
variations in these sensitivities may account for the high variability in behavioural and 
psychophysiological results obtained in healthy human subjects in the IGT and related 
decision-making tasks. The proposed refined version of the Expectancy–Valence 
Model may help explain the experimental findings within the IGT paradigm. 
11.2. VMPFC patients: Do they show decreased emotional awareness 
of risky situations? 
Decreased emotional awareness of risky situations in VMPFC patients may explain 
their bad performance in the IGT and superior performance when risk-taking is 
rewarded (Shiv, Loewenstein and Bechara, 2005). This hypothesis is encouraged by 
current empirical findings and consistent with the proposed refined version of the 
Expectancy–Valence Model, although the predictions for VMPFC patients are less 
clear than for healthy subjects. In VMPFC patients, an important structure for 
decision-making is destroyed. Thus, a variety of explanations for the observed deficits 
are possible. The most robust finding in VMPFC patients is the fact that anticipatory 
SCRs are entirely missing and that these psychophysiological null-findings correlate 
significantly with impaired decision-making in the IGT. However, it could be argued 
that the observed relationship is “only” correlational, since there is no need to infer a 
causal relationship between measured autonomic responses and observed behavioural 
results (Amiez et al., 2003; Crone et al., 2004). Furthermore, other psychological 
mechanisms (e.g. working memory, affective shifting, contingency reversal learning, 
and motivation) necessary for accurate decision-making could be affected instead. 
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Thus, several other possible explanations exist that may account equally well for the 
observed deficits. For example, disruption of working memory functionality might be 
able to explain why VMPFC patients do worse on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1998). 
Moreover, information about individual differences in decision-making before lesion 
onset is generally not available. Therefore, individual behavioural responses cannot be 
directly compared to the behaviour before the accident, surgery, or stroke. However, it 
could be shown that VMPFC patients display decreased emotional awareness of risky 
situations (Shiv, Loewenstein and Bechara, 2005) indicating that at least one of the 
proposed affective dimensions (i.e., sensitivity to punishment) is affected. We argue 
that the proposed refined version of the Expectancy–Valence Model could be used to 
study the behavioural deficits in these patients in more detail. Furthermore, we 
assume that this model would be able to help explain why VMPFC patients have 
difficulties to overcome their tendency to choose the immediate reward options in 
spite of the experienced high losses. 
11.3. Final remarks 
To conclude, anticipatory SCRs that are triggered by certain situations, like the IGT, 
are involved in aiding the decision process under uncertainty and risk (Bechara et al., 
1997; Bechara et al., 1996). Furthermore, they might assist this process by narrowing 
down the possible alternatives how to (re)act. This might be accomplished by refuting 
disadvantageous and endorsing advantageous options. Thus, emotion-related markers 
might act as highly relevant signals in decision-making under uncertainty and risk that 
speed up the decision process. However, these affective reactions can be both 
beneficial and disruptive depending on the circumstances (Shiv, Loewenstein and 
Bechara, 2005). Distinct sensitivities to reward and punishment might be able to 
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explain their adaptive role in decision-making more thoroughly. We argue that a two-
dimensional conceptualization of emotion-related signals might be able to explain the 
huge range of experimental findings obtained within the IGT paradigm in the last 
decade. Furthermore, we assume that the proposed refined version of the Expectancy–
Valence Model is able to contribute significantly to the explanation of these empirical 
results. Finally, we propose that the refined version is able to contribute to the on-
going discussion on the inconsistent empirical results in healthy subjects and to a 
better understanding of the actual role of emotion-related signals in decision-making, 
in particular under uncertainty and risk. 
The SMH is not refuted but seriously challenged by recent research. New 
sophisticated experiments are required to study the function of anticipatory SCRs 
more thoroughly. Other psychophysiological measurements should be included, 
especially heart and respiratory rate, since these autonomic parameters are known to 
be able to distinguish between positive and negative emotions (Rainville et al., 2006) 
and thus between positive and negative somatic markers. The current investigation 
suggests that different sensitivities to punishment and reward play a major role with 
respect to the card drawing behaviour in the IGT. The proposed refined version of the 
Expectancy-Valence Model can be used to model the behaviour of healthy individuals 
and VMPFC patients in the IGT and to develop new experimental designs for future 
studies. 
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14. Appendix 
14.1. Abstract (English) 
Damásio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) provides a plausible neurobiological 
explanation for the deficits observed in real-life decision-making, and for impairments 
found in patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortical (VMPFC) lesions in Bechara’s 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Roughly, the SMH assumes that overt reasoning 
processes are preceded by covert emotional biases (i.e., somatic markers) that help to 
decide advantageously under uncertainty and risk. Recent studies suggest that similar 
mechanisms are responsible for the inferior performance of substance dependent 
individuals (SDIs) and the superior performance of players with high scores in 
neuroticism. Bechara proposes an imbalance between reflective and impulsive 
processes in decision-making as the cause of observed deficits: In VMPFC patients, 
the reflective processes would be directly affected, whereas hyperactivity in the 
amygdala in SDIs would lead to an attenuation of reflective processes and thereby to 
sensitivity to immediate reward, and indifference to possible negative future 
consequences of decisions. Basing our conclusions on a refined version of the 
Expectancy-Valence Model (originally developed by Busemeyer and Stout), we argue 
that distinct sensitivities to punishment and reward might explain the overall 
performance of VMPFC patients and normal controls in the IGT. The following two 
hypotheses are endorsed by the model thus derived: (1) Differences in risk aversion 
can account for the high variability in performance of normal controls. (2) Decreased 
emotional awareness of risky situations in VMPFC patients can explain their poor 
performance in the IGT and their superior performance when risk taking is rewarded. 
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14.2. Abstrakt (Deutsch) 
Damásio’s Hypothese der Somatischen Marker (SMH) stellt eine plausible 
neurobiologische Erklärungsmöglichkeit für die in Patienten mit Läsionen im 
ventromedialen präfrontalen Kortex gefundenen Defizite im Entscheidungsverhalten 
dar. Diese Beeinträchtigungen betreffen vor allem die Performanz dieser Patienten in 
der von Bechara entwickelten experimentellen Spielsituation, genannt „Iowa 
Gambling Task” (IGT). Die SMH besagt, dass Entscheidungsprozeße durch 
unbewußte emotionale Signale (d.h., Somatische Marker) beeinflußt werden können. 
Aktuelle Studien belegen, dass ähnliche Mechanismen auch für die 
Beeinträchtigungen von substanzabhängigen Personen in der IGT verantwortlich sind. 
Interessanterweise, zeigen Personen mit hohen Neurotizismus Werten vorteilhaftes 
Entscheidungsverhalten in diesem experimentellen Paradigma. Bechara erklärt sich 
diese Befunde dadurch, dass es bei Entscheidungsprozessen zu einem Zusammenspiel 
zwischen reflektiven und impulsiven Prozessen kommt. In Patienten mit Läsionen im 
ventromedialen präfrontalen Kortex sind die reflektiven Prozesse direkt 
beeinträchtigt, während bei substanzabhängigen Personen eine Überaktivierung, der 
für die impulsiven Prozesse relevanten Gehirnstrukturen (insbesondere der 
Amygdala), die reflektiven Prozesse im ventromedialen präfrontalen Kortex 
schwächt: Es kommt zu einer Überempfänglichkeit für die belohnenden Effekte von 
Gewinnen und zu einer indifferenten Haltung gegenüber möglichen künftigen 
Verlusten in der IGT. Unsere Schlußfolgerungen basieren auf einer überarbeitenden 
Version des von Busemeyer und Stout vorgeschlagenen „Expectancy-Valence 
Models“ zur Erklärung des Spielverhaltens in der IGT. Wir behaupten, dass 
unterschiedliche Sensitivitäten für Gewinne und Verluste die beeinträchtigte 
Performanz von Patienten mit Läsionen im ventromedialen präfrontalen Kortex und 
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die Variabilität in den Befunden gesunder Probanden in der IGT erklären können. Die 
folgenden zwei Hypothesen werden durch dieses Model nahe gelegt und in der 
vorliegenden Arbeit diskutiert: (1) Die gefundenen Performanzunterschiede im 
Spielverhalten gesunder Versuchspersonen in der IGT lassen sich durch Unterschiede 
in ihrer Risikowahrnehmung (d.h., durch unterschiedliche Sensitivitäten für Gewinne 
und Verluste) erklären. (2) Eine verminderte emotionale Wahrnehmung des 
Risikoaspektes von Spielsituationen in Patienten mit Läsionen im ventromedialen 
präfrontalen Kortex kann die gefundenen Beeinträchtigungen in der IGT und die 
gefundene überlegene Spielstrategie in Spielsituationen, die risikoreiches Verhalten 
belohnen, erklären. 
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